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Some of the most severe collateral consequences of criminal convictions are
imposed through city and county ordinances and policies. This Article offers
the first in-depth examination of these municipal policies, including permits
and licensing ordinances, registration and exclusion zones, third-party
background-check requirements, and local hiring policies. Some municipal
ordinances, such as residential restrictions on sex offenders, impose far
harsher sanctions than their state counterparts, effectively banishing certain
individuals from the community. In addition, municipal licensing ordinances
limit access to occupations-such as street vending, operating a food cart, or
driving a taxicab-that offer valuable entrepreneurial opportunities to
individuals with criminal convictions. Often invisible to defendants at the time
of sentencing, these local policies have been used as a way to exile
"undesirables" by effectively barring them from living, working, or
participating in public ife in their communities. This Article offers suggestions
for legislative reform to address the patchwork of collateral consequences that
can lead to exile at the local level. States may pass laws preempting municipal
restrictions, or municipalities can lead the way by adopting collateral
consequences ordinances (such as the one unanimously passed in New Haven,
Connecticut) that mitigate the impact of these restrictions by setting uniform
standards and informing attorneys and the public.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Harold Williams used to sell drugs to earn a living. After his second
conviction on felony narcotics charges, he was released on parole and resolved
to turn his life around. In the past, he'd occasionally helped his girlfriend
Danielle with her stand at the local flea market, where she used her street
vendor's license to sell clothing, shoes, and sunglasses. Most employers
rejected Harold because of his record, so he started devoting more time to street
vending and discovered he liked it-not just the customer interaction and the
entrepreneurial hustle, but also the pride of earning an honest living that he
could show his young daughter. When Danielle found a new full-time job and
wasn't able to work the stand on weekdays, Harold decided to apply for his own
street vendor's license so he could work the stand full-time and maybe even
expand the business. He could skirt the rules by working under Danielle's
license without her around, but he didn't want to get in trouble; he wanted to
play by the rules and build the business under his own name.
Harold applied to the City of New Haven for a street vendor's license but
was denied because of his criminal record. New Haven's street vendor
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ordinance directed the police chief to determine whether the applicant was a
"suitable person," based on factors including felony convictions within the last
five years. Harold's record was three to four years old, so he was rejected out of
hand. Undaunted, Harold asked his parole officer for support and reapplied a
few months later, this time submitting evidence of rehabilitation with
testimonials from loyal customers and letters from community supporters.
When he was denied again, he started to get frustrated. What was the point in
turning his life around if he'd only be judged for his record instead?
Harold's storyl illustrates the impact of the statutory and regulatory barriers
faced by individuals reentering the community from incarceration. These
barriers are often called collateral consequences, the indirect sanctions imposed
on individuals with criminal convictions by statutes, codes, regulations, and
policies at the federal, state, and local levels.2 Collateral consequences have
wide-ranging effects not only on an individual's ability to secure employment3
or career-related licenses 4 but also voting rights,5 immigration status, 6 and
eligibility for subsidized housing7 and welfare benefits,8 among other areas9 of
his or her life.
1 This account is drawn from the author's conversations with Harold Williams from
2011 to 2012. See also Thomas MacMillan, Hot Dog Harold Gets a Chance, NEW HAVEN
INDEP. (Apr. 3, 2012, 6:41 AM), http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/
entry/hot dogharoldgets a_chance/; ThinkActNewHavenCT, An Honest Living: Harold's
Story, YOuTUBE (June 14, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-UWGXLilYtmc.
2 See, e.g., Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences
of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86
B.U. L. REv. 623, 624-25 (2006); Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal
Convictions: Confronting Issues ofRace and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 459-61 (2010)
[hereinafter Pinard, Collateral Consequences]; Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between
Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of
"Sexually Violent Predators, " 93 MINN. L. REv. 670, 678 (2008).
3 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13041(c) (2012) (providing that employment in a federal or
federally funded child care facility may be denied based on "[a]ny conviction for a sex
crime, an offense involving a child victim, or a drug felony"). See generally Leroy D. Clark,
A Civil Rights Task: Removing Barriers to Employment of Ex-Convicts, 38 U.S.F. L. REV.
193 (2004).
4 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 12a(3) (2012) (authorizing the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission to deny an agriculture commodity dealer's license to any person convicted of a
variety of enumerated felonies and misdemeanors). See generally Donald R. Stacy,
Limitations on Denying Licensure to Ex-Offenders, 2 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (1973).
5 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 48A.6 (West 2012) (disqualifying persons who have
been convicted of a felony from voting and from registering to vote). See generally Richard
M. Re & Christopher M. Re, Voting and Vice: Criminal Disenfranchisement and the
Reconstruction Amendments, 121 YALE L.J. 1584, 1586-87 (2012); Jennifer Rae Taylor,
Constitutionally Unprotected: Prison Slavery, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Criminal
Exception to Citizenship Rights, 47 GONz. L. REV. 365, 378-80 (2011).
6 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478-80 (2010).
7See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13663 (2012) (prohibiting admission to federally assisted
housing for individuals subject to lifetime sex offender registration requirements). See
generally NAT'L Hous. LAW PROJECT, AN AFFORDABLE HOME ON RE-ENTRY: FEDERALLY
3
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Collateral consequences have attracted increased attention in recent years.
Commentators have expressed concern about the reach and the inequities of
collateral consequences, given the increasing numbers of individuals involved
in the criminal justice system'o and its race and income disparities." This
research has generally focused on the collateral consequences imposed at the
state and federal level.
This Article seeks to highlight a category of collateral consequences-those
imposed by municipal law12-that has gone unexamined by the scholarly
literature. The Article will argue that collateral consequences imposed at the
local level can have far-reaching, often severe effects on individuals' ability to
live, work, and engage in public life within their local communities. This
Article will also offer suggestions for legislative reform, at the municipal as
well as the state level, to mitigate these consequences and provide information
about them to attorneys and the public.
Collateral consequences imposed at the local level affect vital issues of
employment and housing. In some areas-such as residential restrictions on sex
offenders-municipal ordinances may impose far harsher sanctions than their
state counterparts, effectively banishing certain individuals from the
community. In addition, municipal licensing ordinances regulate a number of
ASSISTED HOUSING AND PREVIOUSLY INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS 7-13 (2008); Wendy J.
Kaplan & David Rossman, Called "Out" at Home: The One Strike Eviction Policy and
Juvenile Court, 3 DUKE F. FOR L. & Soc. CHANGE 109, 112-21 (2011).
8 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a) (2012) (denying eligibility for food stamp and TANF
benefits to individuals convicted of drug-related felonies); see also Sabra Micah Barnett,
Collateral Sanctions and Civil Disabilities: The Secret Barrier to True Sentencing Reform
for Legislatures and Sentencing Commissions, 55 ALA. L. REV. 375, 376-77 (2004).
9 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of
Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 1789, 1790 (2012) (arguing that the far-reaching and
interlocking nature of collateral consequences amounts to a "new civil death"); Hanh H. Le,
The "Padilla Advisory" and Its Implications Beyond the Immigration Context, 20 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 589, 591-93 (2011) (providing an overview of collateral sanctions in
federal law).
10 MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT'L EMP'T LAW
PROJECT, 65 MILLION "NEED NOT APPLY": THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 4 (2011); see also Written Testimony for Amy
Solomon, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Justice Programs, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to the Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n (July 26, 2011), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/7-26-1 1/solomon.cfm.
" See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 1-18 (2010); Pinard,
Collateral Consequences, supra note 2, at 516-17; see also EEOC, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND
CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964, at 8-10 (2012) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
12 This Article will use the terms "municipality" and "municipal" to refer to cities,
towns, and counties and will generally not draw distinctions among these units of
government. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1061
n.4 (1980) (using the term "city" "to refer to any other institution that exercises general
governmental authority in an area smaller than, yet within, an American state").
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activities-including street vending, operating a food cart, and driving a
taxicab-that provide valuable entrepreneurial opportunities to reentering
individuals. Over the last 150 years, these municipal ordinances have been
employed to exclude "undesirables" like African-Americans and immigrants
from full participation in their local communities. Local registration laws and
residency restrictions have at times been openly justified by their proponents as
intended to prevent certain populations from entering their cities or towns.
Moreover, exclusionary ordinances that withstand legal challenges are often
adopted at the state level, widening their scope.
This Article will address state law preemption as one way in which states
can take action to simplify the patchwork of municipal collateral consequences.
At the same time, municipalities can lead on this issue at the local level by
passing collateral consequences ordinances. Such ordinances build on the
success of municipal "Ban the Box" initiatives, which reduce barriers to
employment by removing the "box" or question about past criminal records
from initial employment applications. One model is the collateral consequences
ordinance passed by New Haven, Connecticut, the first jurisdiction to pass a
law mandating the collection and publication of the collateral consequences of a
criminal conviction. Just as cities have been at the forefront of the "Ban the
Box" movement, so too can they lead the way in enacting policies to examine
and mitigate the collateral consequences of criminal convictions in America.
Part II of this Article will offer background on collateral consequences.
Part III will address the impact of collateral consequences at the local level by
highlighting some of the most common ordinances imposing them: licensing
ordinances, registration and exclusionary zoning ordinances, background check
requirements for municipal employment, and ordinances that require third
parties (such as private employers and landlords) to impose collateral
consequences. This Part will also outline some measures municipalities have
begun to take to mitigate these collateral consequences. Part IV will offer
suggestions for legislative reform at the state and municipal level, and Part V
will conclude.
II. HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
While the issue of collateral consequences has gained increased prominence
in recent years, it is by no means a new invention. Laws imposing civil
disabilities as sanctions for criminal convictions are nearly as old as the
criminal code.13 Over time, these sanctions evolved from direct civil
punishments imposed at sentencing into indirect restrictions imposed through a
patchwork of measures in constitutions, laws, and regulations. In the United
13 Miijan R. Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their Removal:
A Comparative Study, 59 J. CIuM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 347, 350 (1968); see also
Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex
Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 101, 107 (2007) ("Expulsion has been used by
governmental authorities since the time of the Code of Hammurabi in Babylon.").
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States, many modem collateral consequences began with municipal ordinances
that were later adopted by states. Today, collateral consequences pose major
barriers for ever-increasing proportions of Americans, due to increased
incarceration rates and widespread availability of court and criminal records
through online databases.
In early Roman society and Germanic tribes, outlawry could be imposed on
those who committed particularly heinous crimes, requiring exile and the loss of
all possessions and family rights.14 Ancient Greek citizens who committed
crimes were subjected to "infamy," meaning they lost privileges of community
membership including voting, attending assemblies, and serving in the army.' 5
In medieval Europe, individuals convicted of serious crimes were subjected to
"civil death," under which they forfeited civil, family, and property rights.16
These punitive civil measures were imposed as part of the sentence or direct
sanctions for a crime, whether through English common law or European
codes.'7
Early American colonial laws, modeled after the retributive European
model of civil death, specifically restricted individuals with felony convictions
from voting or holding public office.' 8 While medieval European codes and the
English common law had imposed civil death only for especially heinous
crimes, colonial laws singled out individuals who committed moral
indiscretions as well. For example, voting rights could be forfeited after a
conviction for drunkenness or fornication.19
With the Declaration of Independence, states began to enact constitutions
delineating who was eligible to vote, often restricting suffrage to those with
"good character" 20 or without prior felony convictions. 21 Unlike civil death,
which had been imposed as a direct sanction for a serious criminal conviction,
these disenfranchisement measures were now imposed outside of the sentencing
and conviction process. 22 By the time of the Civil War, most states in the Union
had created laws or constitutions denying the vote to individuals convicted of
serious crimes.23
The post-Civil War Reconstruction era marked the emergence of laws and
policies expressly designed to deny privileges to African-Americans under the
14Damaska, supra note 13, at 350.
15 Walter Matthews Grant et al., Special Project-The Collateral Consequences of a
Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REv. 929, 941 (1970).
161d. at 943.
17 Chin, supra note 9, at 1793-95.
18 See Grant et al., supra note 15, at 950.
19 Alec C. Ewald, "Civil Death": The Ideological Paradox of Criminal
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 1045, 1061-62.2 01d. at 1061-63.
21 Howard Itzkowitz & Lauren Oldak, Note, Restoring the Ex-offender's Right To Vote:
Background and Developments, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 721, 725 (1973).
2 2 Ewald, supra note 19, at 1062.
2 3 Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 21, at 725.
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guise of excluding those with criminal convictions. 24 Alongside measures like
the poll tax and literacy test, Southern states carefully constructed new criminal
disenfranchisement provisions to bar African-Americans from voting.25 For
example, Mississippi's 1890 constitutional convention disenfranchised those
convicted of crimes like burglary and theft but not those convicted of violent
crimes like robbery or murder, on the theory that African-Americans were more
likely to engage in "furtive" property crimes. 26 Although facially neutral, these
laws were often selectively enforced against African-Americans while whites
with disqualifying convictions were allowed to vote.27
At the same time, the advent of professional licensing laws in the post-Civil
War era28 created a new set of collateral consequences for individuals with
criminal convictions. Licensing requirements were created for occupations like
street peddling and liquor sales, as well as for professions like barbers,
plumbers, and lawyers. Many states and municipalities prohibited the issuance
of licenses for an applicant with a prior criminal record.29 While proponents
argued that these requirements protected public safety, in practice they
primarily excluded African-Americans and immigrants from access to the
professions. 30
This explosion in licensing laws, sometimes termed the "rise of the
regulatory state," helped to engender the modern system of collateral
consequences: pervasive, complex, and invisible at the time of sentencing. 31
The dearth of information about collateral consequences in the criminal justice
process was compounded by courts' interpretations of the Sixth Amendment
right to legal counsel, which only required defense attorneys to advise their
clients about consequences imposed at sentencing and not about the collateral
consequences which could result from a guilty plea.32
2 4 MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL
CONvICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 8 (2013).
25 Ewald, supra note 19, at 1065.2 6 Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865, 868 (Miss. 1896); see Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction,
Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right To Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 305 (2004).27 Chin, supra note 26, at 306.2 8 Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-
1910: A Legal and Social Study, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 489 (1965); Edward P. Richards,
The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical Practice: A Historical Review and Guide
for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of Physicians in ERISA-Qualed Managed Care
Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 201, 206 (1999); see also Hawker v. New York, 170
U.S. 189, 191 n.1 (1898).29 See infra Part III.A for a history of occupational licensing.
30 David E. Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A Historical Example of the Use of Government
Regulatory Power Against African-Americans, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 89, 96-103 (1994).
31 See Chin, supra note 9, at 1799-1800, 1832.32 See Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky:
From Punishment to Regulation, 31 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 87, 96-97 (2011).
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In the twentieth century, cities enacted ordinances to exclude individuals
with criminal convictions from certain areas, starting in the 1930s with laws
requiring those who passed through city limits to register with law enforcement.
States followed this example by passing statewide registration laws that targeted
individuals with certain types of criminal convictions.
In the mid-1960s and 1970s, legal reformers began calling attention to the
issue of collateral consequences, 33 and some states and courts began responding
to the issue. 34 The trend was quickly reversed by the 1980s, however, with the
rise of the "War on Drugs" and "tough on crime" policies such as mandatory
sentencing laws. These policies led to increased rates of arrests and
incarceration, particularly for African-Americans. 35 States and municipalities
began imposing harsher collateral consequences on broader groups, such as
individuals convicted of misdemeanors. 36 As sex offender registration laws
proliferated throughout the states, 37 municipalities stepped up their efforts by
creating additional ordinances to restrict the residences and movement of those
required to register. 38
Today, over one in four American adults has an arrest or conviction
record.39 Moreover, an estimated 7.5% of American adults have been convicted
of a felony, including 23.3% of the African-American adult population.40
Although many of these records may be years or decades old, the trend towards
computerized databases has made old convictions more accessible to
background checks by employers and government agencies.41 Collateral
consequences also continue to disproportionately affect minority populations,
particularly African-Americans, due to their higher arrest and conviction rates.42
At the same time, the fact that 95% of convictions result from a guilty
plea43 raises concerns about whether defendants understand the full
consequences of a decision to plead guilty. In 2003, the American Bar
Association (ABA) renewed efforts to address this issue by issuing standards
33 See generally Grant et al., supra note 15.
34 LOVE ET AL., supra note 24, at 11.
35 ALEXANDER, supra note 11, at 87-89.
36 Lisa L. Sample & Mary K. Evans, Sex Offender Registration and Community
Notification, in SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIREcTIoNS 211, 212-14
(Richard G. Wright ed., 2009).
37 LOVE ET AL., supra note 24, at 103.
38 Id. at 109.
39 See Solomon, supra note 10.
40 Christopher Uggen, Jeff Manza & Melissa Thompson, Citizenship, Democracy, and
the Civic Reintegration of Criminal Offenders, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI.
281, 288 (2006).
41 James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of
Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 177, 183-84 (2008).
42 See EEOC, supra note 11, at 8-10.
43 Thomas H. Cohen & Tracey Kyckelhahn, Felony Defendants in Large Urban
Counties, 2006, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL., May 2010, at 10.
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recommending that jurisdictions catalog their collateral consequences. 44 The
standards also encouraged prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges to inform
themselves about the relevant collateral consequences in particular cases.45 At
the direction of Congress, 46 the National Institute of Justice contracted with the
ABA to conduct a fifty-state survey of collateral consequences found in state
laws and regulations. 47 By creating a comprehensive database with respect to
state and federal law, the fifty-state survey will ease the research burden that the
ABA standards might otherwise impose on attorneys. 48 For example, the ABA
has already identified over 1100 places in New York state laws and regulations
that impose collateral consequences in areas such as employment, licensing,
government benefits, and education.49
In 2009, the Uniform Law Commission addressed the issue through model
state legislation called the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act
(UCCCA).50 The UCCCA is intended to address or mitigate collateral
consequences in several ways. First, it addresses the standards by which
collateral consequences are imposed, providing that collateral consequences
only be imposed for convictions that are relevant to the benefit sought and that
they should generally be interpreted as discretionary, not mandatory,
sanctions.51 Second, the UCCCA commits the government to catalog and
publish all of the collateral consequences within state laws and regulations, to
be updated annually. 52 Third, the UCCCA requires jurisdictions to advise
defendants about the collateral consequences that may be relevant to their lives,
both before and after conviction.53 Finally, the UCCCA includes detailed
4 4 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS, Standard 19-2.1 (3d ed. 2003).
While the ABA standards refer generally to "jurisdictions," the accompanying commentary
discusses only state and federal codes and does not address their applicability to local
jurisdictions.
45 See id. at Standard 19-2.1 cmt.; see also ABA COMM'N ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES ON REPRESENTATION RELATING TO
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 1 (2007) (urging "federal, state, territorial and local
governments to assist defense counsel in advising clients . . . [and] to encourage prosecutors
to inform themselves of the collateral consequences that may apply in particular cases").
46 Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177 § 510, 121 Stat.
2534, 2543-2544 (2008).
4 7 See Project Description, ABA COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES, http://www.abacol
lateralconsequences.org/description (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
48 Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral
Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 How. L.J. 675, 685 (2011); Love, supra note 32, at 120.
49National Inventory Collateral Consequences Conviction, ABA COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org (select "New York" state, then
select all categories in "Select Consequence Category" box; then select "any offense" in the
"Select Offense Category" box) (last visited Apr. 8, 2013).50 LOVE ET AL., supra note 24, at 508.
51 UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT §§ 7-8 (2010).
52 Id § 4.
531d. §§ 5-6.
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provisions by which states may offer relief from collateral consequences,
including options for expunging records as well as selective relief
mechanisms. 54
In 2010, the Supreme Court recognized the devastating impact that
collateral consequences could have on defendants in Padilla v. Kentucky.55 As
noted above, courts had long held that while the Sixth Amendment requires
attorneys to advise defendants of the direct consequences of a guilty plea, they
had no obligation to advise defendants of the collateral consequences likely to
arise after completing their sentences. 56 Furthermore, courts routinely held that
a defendant given inaccurate advice about the collateral or direct consequences
of a guilty plea could withdraw his or her plea under the Sixth Amendment.57
This "affirmative misadvice" exception further discouraged lawyers from
advising their clients about the potential collateral consequences they faced for
pleading guilty, even when such consequences were obviously relevant. In
Padilla, however, the Supreme Court held that a defense attorney's failure to
inform his client about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea could
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.58 Instead of drawing a distinction
between direct and collateral consequences, the court held that attorneys must
advise their clients about any consequence that is "integral" to the plea because
of its clear, automatic, and severe nature.59 The Court criticized the "affirmative
misadvice" exception as creating the "absurd" effect of giving lawyers "an
incentive to remain silent on matters of great importance, even when answers
are readily available." 60
The decision in Padilla touched off a wave of litigation contending that
defense attorneys must inform their clients about other types of collateral
consequences as well. 61 For example, lower courts have held that failing to
advise a client about sex offender registration requirements stemming from a
guilty plea could constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 62 On the other
hand, some courts have declined to interpret Padilla as requiring attorneys to
advise their clients of the employment-related consequences of a guilty plea. 63
54 Id. §§ 10-15.
55 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010).
56 See Love, supra note 32, at 96-97.
5 71d. at 99.
58 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486.
59 Id. at 1480-82.60 1d at 1484.
61 Malia Brink, A Gauntlet Thrown: The Transformative Potential of Padilla v.
Kentucky, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 39, 44-45 (2011); Love, supra note 32, at 107-11.
62 See People v. Fonville, 804 N.W.2d 878, 894-96 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011); Taylor v.
State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 388-89 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
6 3 Thomas v. United States, No. RWT-10-2274, 2011 WL 1457917, at *4 (D. Md. Apr.
15, 2011); see also Commonwealth v. Abraham, 62 A.3d 343, 349-50 (Pa. 2012) (holding
that counsel was not ineffective for failing to advise the defendant that pleading guilty would
lead to his losing his public employee pension under state law).
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This renewed interest in mitigating collateral consequences and informing
defendants, however, has not yet translated to legislative efforts at the state or
federal level. To date, no state has enacted the UCCCA in its entirety64 and only
one state, North Carolina, has partially adopted it. North Carolina's law, enacted
in 2011, creates a scheme by which individuals with less serious criminal
convictions may apply for certificates of relief from certain collateral
consequences. 65 The law does not address the collection of collateral
consequences or the standards by which they are imposed. 66
At the same time, the discussion about collateral consequences has largely
ignored the issue of collateral consequences imposed by cities, towns, and
counties. Although the ABA includes local jurisdictions in its standards, it has
not published research or offered assistance to attorneys regarding local
collateral consequences as it has at the state and federal level. Given that the
Census counts over 3000 county governments and nearly 36,000 municipal,
town, and township governments across the United States, 67 it may be
impractical to attempt a comprehensive national survey of collateral
consequences in municipal codes of ordinances. However, the widespread
availability of searchable city and county codes through proprietary websites
and online databases68 suggests that many attorneys and judges have the
capacity to determine relevant collateral consequences in their own local
jurisdictions.
III. IMPACT OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
The lack of attention given to municipal collateral consequences is likely
due not only to the sheer number of cities and towns but also to the limitations
64 See Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Collateral%20Consequences%20fo/2OConvicti
on%20Act (last visited Jan. 11, 2014). For a detailed discussion of the sections of the
UCCCA, see infra Part IV.B. New Mexico's state legislature has twice passed versions of
the UCCCA that were vetoed by the governor. See Gov. SUSANA MARTINEZ, N.M. SENATE
EXECUTIVE MESSAGE No. 48 (Apr. 5, 2013), available at http://govemor.state.nm.us/up
loads/PressRelease/59fe4746f9614e8a8f62b0c5613a2f7f/SENATE%20EXECUTIVE%20M
ESSAGE%20NO.%2048.pdf; Gov. SUSANA MARTINEZ, N.M. HOUSE EXECUTIVE MESSAGE
No. 24 (Apr. 7, 2011), available at http://onlawyering.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/
VetoHB31 1-1.pdf.
65 Act To Establish a Certificate of Relief, N.C. Sess. Law 2011-265, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 15A-173.1 to -173.6 (2011).
6 6 Id
6 7 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS: ORGANIZATION COMPONENT
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES (July 23, 2012), available at http://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/
2012/fornatted_prelim counts 23jul2012 2.pdf.
68 See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right ofAction, 64 STAN. L. REV.
1109, 1125 (2012) ("All major cities and counties post their codes on their proprietary
websites, accessible to all Internet users, and online databases, such as Municode.com, aim
to consolidate as many city and county codes as possible into one searchable location.").
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on the types of laws they can enact. Municipalities are "creature[s] of the state
legislature"69 and have no powers outside of those conferred by the state. 70
Therefore, a municipality generally cannot adopt an ordinance that goes beyond
the powers granted to it by the state's laws, constitution, or home rule charter.71
Moreover, if the state law conflicts with or preempts a municipal ordinance
governing a particular field, the municipal ordinance is void. 72
Despite these limitations, municipalities generally have the power to
regulate businesses and activities within their borders in order to preserve public
health and welfare. 73 In other situations, the state or federal government may
expressly delegate authority to municipal governments or local agencies to
carry out certain tasks.74 Municipalities also have the administrative and
executive authority, of course, to appoint officers, agents, and employees to
carry out their duties. 75 Moreover, with the advent of home-rule powers, forty-
three states have granted municipalities enhanced powers of self-government. 76
Whether through home-rule or state-granted powers, municipal governments
and agencies commonly impose collateral consequences on individuals with
criminal convictions in four general ways: (1) licensing requirements that
disqualify individuals based on past convictions or moral unfitness; (2) offender
registries and zoning-style restrictions on areas where individuals may reside or
enter, based on past arrests or convictions; (3) background check requirements
for municipal employment; and (4) "third-party" collateral consequences that
require private employers or landlords to conduct background checks or reject
6 9 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 3:2 (3d ed., updated
July 2012).
701d. § 10:3.
71 Id. In a few states, courts have recognized certain limited "inherent powers" of self-
government held by municipalities. See id.
72 Id. § 21:32.
7 31d. § 10:29.
74 This Article will not address collateral consequences imposed by public housing
authorities or local subsidized housing providers, such as background-check policies and
bans on residence for individuals convicted of certain types of offenses. Such policies are
governed by federal laws and regulations rather than by municipal ordinances, although
local public housing authorities and local subsidized housing providers have broad discretion
to develop their own policies regarding criminal records for prospective or current tenants.
The impact that such policies can have on lower-income individuals with criminal records
who seek affordable housing, however, suggests the importance of understanding the
background-check policies of the public housing authorities and subsidized housing
providers on a local community level. See, e.g., NAT'L HOUSING LAW PROJECT, supra note 7,
at 92-106; MARIE CLAIRE TRAN-LEUNG, SARGENT SHRIVER NAT'L CTR. ON POvERTY LAW,
WHEN DISCRETION MEANS DENIAL: THE USE OF CRIMINAL RECORDS TO DENY Low-INCOME
PEOPLE ACCESS TO FEDERALLY SUBSIDIZED HOUSING IN ILLINOIS 2-5 (2011).
7 5 MCQUILLIN, supra note 69, § 10:44.
76 Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1409, 1423 (2001).
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individuals with criminal records. 7 This Part will discuss these general
categories of municipal collateral consequences and the depth of their impact on
individuals reentering their communities after arrest or incarceration.
Some of these restrictions may play a meaningful role in protecting public
safety, such as requiring criminal background checks for aspiring police
officers. However, this Part will argue that these restrictions often go beyond
excluding those with relevant criminal histories, instead disproportionately
affecting other traditionally marginalized populations such as the poor, African-
Americans, and immigrants. While courts have largely upheld these types of
restrictions as within the realm of traditional public health and welfare
regulation, they can prevent individuals from finding employment or a place to
live, and limit their ability to engage in public life within their local
communities. Moreover, where local ordinances have been upheld by courts,
they may become models for similar state laws. Some municipalities have
begun enacting ordinances that recognize and seek to limit certain barriers in
employment and housing, suggesting a path for broader legislative reform of
municipal collateral consequences.
A. Background Check Requirements for Licensing
Today, restrictions on the issuance of permits and licenses78 are frequently
cited as a key source of barriers to employment for individuals with criminal
convictions. 79 Yet the literature addressing collateral consequences has largely
ignored municipal licensing regimes, despite their widespread role in the
regulation of businesses and occupations.80 Municipal licensing ordinances
7 Although the distinction between "direct" and "collateral" consequences is an
artificial one, this Article will not address municipal ordinances that impose additional direct
sanctions on individuals arrested or convicted for certain crimes. This includes, for example,
local penal ordinances which criminalize "petty offenses" or lengthen sentences beyond
those provided by state law. See id. at 1433-36. By the same reasoning, this Article will not
address municipal civil forfeiture ordinances, which allow for the seizure of vehicles and
property connected to a broad range of crimes such as driving under the influence, drug
transactions, and prostitution. See id. at 1432. For a contrary viewpoint that classifies civil
forfeiture proceedings as collateral consequences because they proceed independent of
criminal actions see LOVE ET AL., supra note 24, at 153. Because many municipal civil
forfeiture ordinances have been struck down by courts as preempted by state law, however,
they are likely to have less far-reaching effects than the policies discussed in this Article.
See, e.g., City of L.A. v. 2000 Jeep Cherokee, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 252, 256 (Ct. App. 2008);
City of Springfield v. $10,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 767 P.2d 476, 478 (Or. Ct. App. 1989);
Linn Cnty. v. 22.16 Acres of Real Prop., 767 P.2d 473, 475-76 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
78This Article will use the terms "permit" and "license" interchangeably. MCQUILLIN,
supra note 69, § 26:2.
79 See Chin, supra note 9, at 1802; W. Brooke Graves, Professional and Occupational
Restrictions, 13 TEMP. L.Q. 334, 346 (1939); Karol Lucken & Lucille M. Ponte, A Just
Measure of Forgiveness: Reforming Occupational Licensing Regulations for Ex-offenders
Using BFOQ Analysis, 30 LAW & POL'Y 46, 53-54 (2008).
80 See MCQUILLIN, supra note 69, § 26:65.
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generally regulate occupations that are thought to infringe on community
morals or local order (such as liquor-serving establishments or dance halls) or
that occupy local rights-of-way (such as street carts and taxicabs). 8' This
Section offers a brief overview of the history of municipal licensing ordinances
as well as challenges to the collateral consequences they impose, and discusses
the barriers they create to employment for individuals with criminal
convictions.
1. Licensing ofEstablishments Thought To Cause Nuisances
Licensing laws first arose through liquor licensing efforts in the latter half
of the nineteenth century, accompanying the rise of temperance societies in the
United States.82 While some states took on licensing laws themselves, many left
the task of regulation up to local cities and towns. 83 The City of San Francisco,
for example, passed an ordinance in 1878 requiring the consent of the board of
police commissioners to obtain a retail liquor license.84 The city's authority to
enact the ordinance was affirmed by the Supreme Court, which justified the
denial of a liquor license to an applicant on the grounds that his wife had been
previously arrested for stealing from visitors to their saloon.85 The Court held
that the ordinance furthered the goal of enforcing public morality as well as
reducing crime: "The statistics of every state show a greater amount of crime
and misery attributable to the use of ardent spirits obtained at these retail liquor
saloons than to any other source." 86
Soon, states and municipalities were amending liquor licensing ordinances
to exclude individuals with criminal records, fueled by ongoing concerns about
crime and morality and influenced by widespread perceptions that immigrants
and non-whites were to blame for the problems of intemperance. 87 In 1893, for
example, San Francisco modified its ordinance to expressly prohibit the
issuance of a liquor license to any person with a past felony conviction.88 The
California Supreme Court upheld the ordinance, reasoning that using a felony as
a measure of moral character was within the government's police power to
protect the public. 89
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, municipalities
began requiring licenses for other businesses thought to create nuisances or pose
81 See John J. Mortimer & Patrick W. Dunne, Grant and Revocation of Licenses, 1957
U. ILL. L.F. 28, 41-42.8 2 jAMES SAMUELSON, THE HISTORY OF DRINK: A REVIEw, SOCIAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND
POLITICAL 208-09, 240 (1878).83 Id. at 217.
84 Foster v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs of S.F., 37 P. 763, 764 (Cal. 1894).
85 Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 95 (1890).86 Id. at 9 1.87 SAMUELSON, supra note 82, at 205.
88 Foster, 37 P. at 764.891d. at 765.
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a threat to public morality. Ordinances particularly focused on those
businesses-like dance halls and pool rooms-that were most associated with
licentiousness among African-Americans and women.90 Between 1885 and
1914, for example, at least seventeen major cities proposed or enacted
ordinances requiring the licensing of dance halls.91
Today, municipal ordinances commonly require licenses for dance halls,
liquor-serving establishments, arcades, pool halls, bowling alleys, movie
theaters, massage parlors, and adult-oriented businesses. 92 These licensing
ordinances often include a criminal background check requirement, and may
either explicitly exclude individuals convicted of certain criminal convictions or
implicitly exclude them through a requirement that applicants be of "good
moral character." 93 These collateral consequences have been upheld by courts
even when they impose broad bans on criminal records, on the grounds that
communities have a legitimate purpose in ensuring that businesses which may
"pose a significant threat to the peace of the community" are run by "persons of
integrity with respect for the law." 94
Even seemingly vague requirements regarding moral character have been
upheld when they govern licensing for businesses thought to create potential
neighborhood nuisances. For example, the Supreme Court held that a city
ordinance licensing coin-operated arcades was not void for vagueness when it
required the city's police chief to evaluate the applicant's character, including
convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude and "connections with
criminal elements." 95 Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that
a city's refusal to issue a restaurant license to an individual on grounds that he
lacked "good moral character" was justified in part by the fact that he had two
convictions over twenty years ago for "serious crimes involving moral
turpitude." 96
2. Licensing of Occupations and Professions
Building on the trend of requiring businesses to obtain licenses to protect
public morality, broader professional licensing laws proliferated throughout
90 See, e.g., Georgina Hickey, Waging War on "Loose Living Hotels" and "Cheap
Soda Water Joints": The Criminalization of Working-Class Women in Atlanta's Public
Space, 82 GA. HIST. Q. 775, 776-77 (1998); Gregory Mixon, "Good Negro-Bad Negro":
The Dynamics of Race and Class in Atlanta During the Era of the 1906 Riot, 81 GA. HiST.
Q. 593, 600-01 (1997).
91 Elisabeth I. Perry, "The General Motherhood of the Commonwealth ": Dance Hall
Reform in the Progressive Era, 37 AM. Q. 719, 729-30 (1985).
92 MCQUILLIN, supra note 69, §§ 26:154.46 to .59.
93 See, e.g., Darks v. City of Cincinnati, 745 F.2d 1040, 1042 (6th Cir. 1984).
94 1d. at 1043.
95 City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289-92 (1982).96 Chequinn Corp. v. Mullen, 193 A.2d 432, 436 (Me. 1963).
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states and municipalities in the first half of the twentieth century. 97 Although
their stated justifications were to protect the public, many licensing regulations
were passed after significant lobbying by trade associations seeking to keep
others out of the profession. 98 For example, taxicab licensing arose during the
Great Depression after out-of-work individuals flocked to become drivers,
given the low start-up costs required for the job.99 Trade associations of
established drivers responded by lobbying for ordinances to limit entry.' 00
Some of the professions for which licenses became required during this period,
such as photographers and barbers, have a seemingly tenuous connection to
public health and safety. 101 Facially neutral licensing regulations were often
used to discourage or exclude minority groups, particularly African-Americans,
from entering these professions.1 02
Many of these licensing laws included restrictions or outright bans on
individuals with criminal records, sometimes more as a convenient way of
excluding potential competitors than based on any relevant concern for public
safety. 103 Others required that the applicant demonstrate "good moral
character," which could eliminate from consideration those with misdemeanor
convictions or even only an arrest record. 104
Although most professional licensing laws were passed by states,
municipalities began to license occupations as well, particularly those found on
local rights-of-way such as street vendors, door-to-door peddlers, food carts,
and taxicabs. These municipal licensing ordinances drew authority from the
traditional municipal regulation of public markets' hours and location. 05 In
many cases, these licensing ordinances targeted occupations-such as street or
pushcart vendors-that were associated with immigrants and the poor, seeking
97 Frank Hanft & J. Nathaniel Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation Under Licensing
Statutes, 17 N.C. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1938); see also Daniel B. Hogan, The Effectiveness of
Licensing: History, Evidence, and Recommendations, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 117, 120
(1983); Simon Rottenberg, The Economics of Occupational Licensing, in NAT'L BUREAU OF
ECON. RESEARCH, ASPECTS OF LABOR EcoNOMICs 3, 4-6 (1962).
98 Hanft & Hamrick, supra note 96, at 4.
99 Lee A. Harris, Taxicab Economics: The Freedom To Contract for a Ride, 1 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 195, 205-06 (2002).
100 Id. at 206.
101 Friedman, supra note 28, at 520-24; Hanft & Hamrick, supra note 97, at 3-4.
102 Timothy Sandefur, Equality of Opportunity in the Regulatory Age: Why Yesterday's
Rationality Review Isn't Enough, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 457, 487-95 (2004); see also
Bernstein, supra note 30, at 94-103.
103 See James W. Robinson, Occupational Licensing, the Ex-offender, and Society, 31
JUST. Sys. J. 69, 71 (1975); Stacy, supra note 4, at 6.
104 Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-offender Reentry, 45
B.C. L. REv. 255, 281-82 (2004).
105 Daniel M. Bluestone, "The Pushcart Evil": Peddlers, Merchants, and New York
City's Streets, 1890-1940, 18 J. URB. HIST. 68, 69 (1991).
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to eliminate them from public view on the grounds that the carts caused
congestion and blight. 106
Whether a particular occupation is licensed by the state or by municipalities
can differ by region and by profession. For example, taxicab licensing is
regulated at the municipal level in all but three states, where state legislatures
have chosen to regulate the field.107 Other occupations, such as general
contractors or electricians, are often regulated at the state level, but may be
licensed by municipalities as well. 0 8
As with other professional licensing laws, these municipal licensing
ordinances frequently include restrictions on applicants' criminal convictions or
"good moral character" requirements.109 For example, the City of Frostproof,
Florida, prohibits issuing a peddler's license to anyone who has ever been
convicted of a felony.1o Indianapolis prohibits anyone convicted of a felony or
misdemeanor involving violence towards another person from being granted a
taxicab license,"1' while Spokane, Washington, requires applicants to submit an
affidavit affirming that they have not been convicted of several types of
offenses, including offenses involving moral turpitude and felonies within the
last ten years.112 New York City requires that general contractors and others
engaged in the building trades obtain a license and that they be of "good moral
character,"1 3 which has been interpreted to exclude applicants with prior
criminal convictions.1 4 More recently, fears about individuals convicted of sex
offenses have spurred several cities to pass licensing ordinances for ice cream
trucks that specifically ban individuals required to register as sex offenders.115
These licensing restrictions have been frequently upheld by courts as
justifiable regulations protecting public health and safety.116 For example, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the denial of a taxicab license by the City
of Baltimore on the grounds that the applicant had previously been convicted of
disorderly conduct on three occasions for participating in unruly student
106 d. at 75-80.
107 Harris, supra note 99, at 196 n.3.108 MCQUILLIN, supra note 69, §§ 26:142 to 143; see, e.g., Jim Merkel, Checking Out
the Contractors, GRANITE CITY PREss-REcoRD, Aug. 15, 2012, at A4.
109 See, e.g., Nick Dranias, The Local Liberty Charter: Restoring Grassroots Liberty To
Restrain Cities Gone Wild, 3 PHx. L. REv. 113, 136 (2010).
110 FROSTPROOF, FLA., CODE § 14-22 (2012).
"'INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE § 996-22 (2012). The restriction does not apply to
individuals who already had a taxicab license at the time the ordinance became effective.
112 SPOKANE, WASH., CODE § 10.34.120 (2011).
13 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 28-401.6 (2008).
114 Duffy v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 14-14B, 795 F. Supp. 2d 246, 255
(E.D.N.Y. 2011).
115Jeff Martin, Push on To Inspect Ice Cream Vendors' Pasts, USA TODAY,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-05-1 1-ice-cream-vendorsN.htm?csp=1
(last updated May 12, 2008,7:28 AM).
116 Grant et al., supra note 15, at 1004.
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protests, and had undergone psychiatric treatment.1 17 Such restrictions are
rarely struck down unless they are applied inconsistently.118 For example, the
D.C. Court of Appeals overturned the denial of a vendor's license to an
applicant who had provided evidence to demonstrate his rehabilitation from his
conviction two years earlier, but noted that the denial would likely have been
upheld had the licensing agency issued written guidelines relating the types of
criminal convictions relevant to the license sought.' 19
3. The Impact of Collateral Consequences in Municipal Licensing
Licensing restrictions have been identified as one of the key types of
collateral consequences about which attorneys should advise defendants facing
criminal charges.120 Whether imposed at the municipal, state, or federal level,
licensing restrictions pose major barriers to employment.121 Moreover, the
collateral consequences of municipal licensing ordinances have particularly far-
reaching implications for the ability of individuals with criminal convictions to
earn a livelihood and to participate in the public lives of their communities.
While municipalities issue a more limited range of permits and licenses than
states, the nature of these regulations-which address the use of public rights-
of-way and potential threats to community order and morality-
disproportionately affect underprivileged populations who are more likely to
have contact with the criminal justice system. Prior to passing a collateral
consequences ordinance, the City of New Haven, Connecticut, examined its
records of food cart applications and found that around one in seven applicants
were rejected on the grounds of a past criminal record. 122
Regulations on taxicabs, street vending, and food carts affect low-income
minority populations in two major ways. First, these occupations are
1l7 Kaufnan v. Taxicab Bureau, Balt. City Police Dep't, 204 A.2d 521, 524-25 (Md.
1964).
118 See, e.g., Miller v. Carter, 547 F.2d 1314, 1316 (7th Cir. 1977) (voiding on equal
protection grounds a Chicago ordinance permanently barring individuals convicted of
felonies or crimes involving moral turpitude within the previous eight years from receiving a
chauffeur's license, because the ordinance allowed individuals who already possessed
licenses to retain them if convicted of the same crimes).
19 Miller v. D.C. Bd. of Appeals & Review, 294 A.2d 365, 370 (D.C. 1972).
120 McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal Defense Attorney's Guide
to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. TOL. L. REv. 479, 498 (2005)
(suggesting that defense attorneys seeking to triage the key collateral consequences faced by
clients should ask four questions, one of which is "Are you a public employee or do you
hold an employment license?").
121 Bruce E. May, The Character Component of Occupational Licensing Laws: A
Continuing Barrier to the Ex-felon's Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. REv. 187, 206
(1995); see also Clark, supra note 3, at 195.
122 Press Release, City of New Haven, Building on the Success of Ban the Box, Mayor
DeStefano Announces New Reentry Initiative Proposal (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.cityof
newhaven.conMayor/ReadMore.asp?ID= {9BF32A73-A87E-4CF9-8052-El9D227E1740}.
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entrepreneurial activities with low barriers to entry; they require little formal
education and a relatively small capital investment. 123 This makes them an
excellent fit for those who face barriers to traditional employment, including
individuals with criminal convictions and minority populations who have
traditionally faced discrimination by employers.1 24 For those who have been
economically marginalized, occupations like street vending can help build
capital and knowledge about how to operate a business.125
Second, sealing off these occupations from individuals with criminal
convictions can have a more insidious effect-that of sealing off the public
sphere. These occupations are uniquely within the public eye, as they literally
occupy public streets and sidewalks while interacting with the public. Regina
Austin has argued that street vending offers the opportunity for African-
Americans to "build a more viable black public sphere."1 26 Similarly, street
vendors in Los Angeles predominantly gather in Latino neighborhoods and are
seen as perpetuating customs from Latin America. 127 Efforts to limit licensing
for street vendors have been associated with efforts to prevent minorities,
immigrants, and the poor from "blighting" public streets. 128 While criminal
background check policies have been upheld as permissible public safety
regulations, responsible policies should refer to relevant convictions only and
clearly outline the standards for relevance.
B. Municipal Registration and Exclusionary Ordinances
Numerous municipalities have enacted ordinances that require individuals
with certain convictions to register with law enforcement, or that ban those
individuals from entering or passing through certain zones. These ordinances
are rooted in municipal zoning powers, which were first used to pass zoning and
town-planning ordinances in the early twentieth century.129 These regulations
were justified as part of municipalities' police powers to protect public health
and welfare.130
As with licensing ordinances, town-planning policies were often used to
exclude "undesirable" populations from the local community under the pretense
123 See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, Can You Get There from Here?: How the Law Still
Threatens King's Dream, 22 LAW & INEQ. 1, 20 (2004).
124 Gregg W. Kettles, Regulating Vending in the Sidewalk Commons, 77 TEMP. L. REV.
1, 22-23 (2004).125 Regina Austin, "An Honest Living": Street Vendors, Municipal Regulation, and the
Black Public Sphere, 103 YALE L.J. 2119, 2123 (1994).
126Id. at 2131.
127 Kettles, supra note 124, at 41.
128 Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 455 (2001);
Bluestone, supra note 105, at 74.
129 See, e.g., Town of Windsor v. Whitney, 111 A. 354, 356 (Conn. 1920); Comment,
The Constitutionality of Zoning Laws, 32 YALE L.J. 833, 833-35 (1923).
130 Town of Windsor, 111 A. at 356.
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of public safety. Starting with a 1911 Baltimore ordinance, cities enacted
explicitly racial "segregation ordinances" that zoned blocks or neighborhood
districts into white and non-white areas. 131 After the Supreme Court invalidated
racial segregation zoning ordinances in 1917 on the grounds that they violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 132 many communities
turned to more facially neutral measures to accomplish the same goal.133
While today's municipal registration and exclusionary zoning ordinances
draw on modern theories about crime control, they share common motivations
with historical efforts by local governments to exclude poor or undesirable
populations from their communities. 134 This Section will discuss the history of
municipal registration ordinances, which require individuals convicted of
certain offenses to register with local law enforcement, as well as exclusionary
zoning ordinances, which prohibit registered individuals from entering or
residing in certain areas.
1. Municipal Registration Ordinances
While offender registration requirements have gained prominence in recent
decades through the rise of state and federal sex offender registration and
notification laws, they were pioneered by municipalities in the 1930s. The first
municipal registration ordinances required persons with any type of conviction,
whether residing or passing through city limits, to register with local law
enforcement.135 These municipal ordinances were fueled by concerns about out-
of-state "gangsters" flooding into local communitieS. 136 The passage of
municipal registration ordinances often had a "ripple effect" in communities:
Once one city passed a registration ordinance, neighboring cities soon followed
suit in order to avoid a potential influx of undesirable residents from other
communities. 137
By the 1950s, at least forty-seven cities had enacted general registration
ordinances. The policies had also filtered up to five states, which enacted more
limited registration laws targeting only individuals with certain types of
convictions (such as California's sex offender registration law enacted in
131 T.B. Benson, Note, Segregation Ordinances, 1 VA. L. REG. (N.s.) 330, 330 (1915);
Rachel D. Godsil, Race Nuisance: The Politics of Law in the Jim Crow Era, 105 MICH. L.
REv. 505, 539 (2006).
132 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917).
133 CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 142-48 (The Lawbook
Exchange 2000) (1940).
134 Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-offender Residence Exclusion
Laws, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1, 10-12 (2006).
135 Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Past,
Present, and Future, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3, 4 (2008).
136Id.; see also LovE ET AL., supra note 24, at 103.137 LOVE ET AL., supra note 24, at 63-65.
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1949).138 The spread of general municipal registration ordinances was halted,
however, by several high-profile court decisions in the 1950s and 1960s. First,
in 1957 the Supreme Court ruled that Los Angeles' felon registration ordinance
violated due process requirements, as applied to a woman who had long lived in
the city with no notice and no actual knowledge of her duty to register.139 The
Court noted that the registration requirement was triggered by mere presence in
the city and that it imposed criminal penalties without any mechanism for
notifying individuals who entered the city that they might be required to
register, or any requirement of actual or probable knowledge on the
defendant.140 Next, two state supreme courts ruled that general municipal
criminal registration ordinances were preempted by state law. In 1960, the
California Supreme Court voided the same Los Angeles ordinance entirely on
the grounds that it was preempted by the state's comprehensive regulatory
schemes regarding registration and supervision of individuals with criminal
records, including the statewide sex offender registration law.141 Similarly, in
1969 the Supreme Court of New Jersey voided the borough of Belmar's general
offender registration ordinance, finding that it was preempted both by the state's
registration law for drug offenders and also by the state's overall policy of
rehabilitating offenders through its parole and probation systems.142 The court
further noted that the city's ordinance appeared to have little effectiveness, as it
had resulted in a mere handful of registrations over the four years since it had
been enacted.143
In the wake of a handful of high-profile assaults and abductions of children
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, states began enacting new registration laws
targeting individuals convicted of sex offenses.144 The federal government
began requiring states to establish such registries in 1994 with the passage of
the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Act,145 named after an eleven-year-old boy abducted by an
unidentified stranger.146 As these state and federal registration laws withstood
court challenges,147 municipalities have returned to the topic of registration,
138 Id. at 65.
139 Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1957).
140Id. at 229.
141 Abbott v. City of L.A., 349 P.2d 974, 979 (Cal. 1960).
142 State v. Ulesky, 252 A.2d 720, 722-23 (N.J. 1969).
I4 3 Id. at 723.
144 Sample & Evans, supra note 36, at 212-14.
145 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322
§170101, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071-14073), repealed by Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 16911 (2006)).
146 Karen J. Terry & Alissa R. Ackerman, A Brief History of Major Sex Offender Laws,
in SEX OFFENDER LAWS, supra note 36, at 65, 79.
147See, e.g., Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2003) (holding that
Connecticut's registration and community notification law did not violate the due process
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enacting more-stringent sex offender registries or registries for individuals
convicted of gun offenses.
Albuquerque has created its own municipal sex offender registry, which
includes broader registration requirements in an effort to close "loopholes" in
the state law.148 While New Mexico law limited registration requirements to
individuals who were convicted or remained incarcerated on or after July 1,
1995, Albuquerque's ordinance applies to any adult convicted of a sex offense
against a child after 1970.149 The ordinance allowed only sixty days for
individuals convicted over three decades ago to register in person with the
Albuquerque Police Department, with failure to register punishable as a
misdemeanor. 50 The registration ordinance was almost entirely justified on
exclusionary grounds, designed to drive out a high-profile sex offender who had
settled in the town and to make it difficult for others to live there.151 According
to Mayor Martin Chavez, the ordinance was intended "to help make
Albuquerque one of the least desirable locations in the country for sex
offenders." 52
Other municipalities have recently experimented with gun offender
registration ordinances, which seek to address gun violence by monitoring high-
risk offenders returning to their communities. Their express purpose is not to
exclude these offenders, but to supervise and control the behavior that leads to
gun violence. The ordinances are patterned, however, after sex offender
registration laws and premised on the idea that such laws have led to effective
enforcement and supervision for individuals convicted of sex offenses. 153
New York City passed the first gun offender registration ordinance in 2006
as part of a package of bills intended to combat gun violence.154 The ordinance
required that any individual convicted of certain gun offenses (such as unlawful
possession of a firearm) would have to register with the New York City Police
rights of individuals required to register, because registration requirements were solely based
on convictions which they had previously had an opportunity to contest).
14 8 Chris Ramirez, Child Molesters Are Given Two Months To Register, ALBUQUERQUE
J., Oct. 30, 2003, at D2.
149 Lloyd Jojola, Mayor Warns Sexual Predators, ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 7, 2004, at E2.
150Id.; Ramirez, supra note 148.
151 See Katie Burford, Rapist Left N.M Saturday, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 16, 2002, at
Al; Richard Willing, Albuquerque's Targeting of Sex Offenders Challenged, USA TODAY,
May 12, 2003, at A4.
152 Lloyd Jojola, Tougher Sex-Offender Law "Goes Too Far, " ALBUQUERQUE J., June
14, 2003, at Al.
153Frequently Asked Questions About Gun Offender Registries, MAYORS AGAINST
ILLEGAL GUNs, http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/downloads/pdf/Balto-NYCcom
bined GORA FAQ.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).
154Press Release, N.Y.C. Office of the Mayor, Mayor Bloomberg Signs Legislation To
Combat Gun Violence in New York City (July 27, 2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/
portal/site/nycgov/menuitem.cO935b9a57bb4ef3daf2flc701c789a0/index.jsp?pagelD=mayor
press release&catlD= 1194&doc name=http%3A%2F/o2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom
%2Fhtml%2F2006b%2Fpr266-06.html&cc-unusedl978&rc=1 194&ndi=l.
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Department for four years after conviction or release from incarceration.155 In-
person registration is required within forty-eight hours of release, as well as
every six months for the required registration period, and within ten days of a
change of address; failure to register is punishable as a misdemeanor offense. 156
Similar ordinances were passed by Baltimore in 2007; by Washington, D.C.,
and Utica, New York, in 2009; and by Chicago and Suffolk County, New York,
in 2010.157
As these ordinances have proliferated, they have become more expansive,
imposing additional collateral consequences on individuals with criminal
convictions. For example, while New York City's registry information is shared
only among police agencies, Chicago's registry is available online, allowing the
public to search by neighborhood and view pictures, names, qualifying offenses,
and other information for the individuals required to register. 158 Fueled by
concerns that not enough individuals were registering, Chicago's city council
recently expanded the number of gun-related offenses requiring registration. 159
Municipal gun offender registries have withstood early legal challenges
similar to those mounted against sex offender registration laws, with a
Maryland appeals court upholding Baltimore's ordinance against claims that it
was unconstitutionally vague, violated equal protection guarantees, and was
preempted by state law. 160 As with sex offender registration laws, these
ordinances have begun to move from city councils to state legislatures: in April
2013, Connecticut became the first state to enact a dangerous weapons offender
registry as part of a comprehensive gun-control package.161
2. Exclusionary Zoning Ordinances
As sex offender registration laws increasingly became the province of state
and federal legislation, municipalities have turned to zoning-style restrictions on
the movements or residences of individuals with criminal convictions. For
example, most restrictions on where registered sex offenders may live are
155 N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 10-604 (2012).
156 1d. § 10-602.
157 DuKE CHEN, CONN. OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, GUN OFFENDER REGISTRIES
IN OTHER CITIES (Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2011/rpt/2011-R-013
8.htm.
158 CLEARMAP Registered Gun Offenders, CHI. POLICE DEP'T, http://gis.chicagopo
lice.org/CLEARMaprgo/startPage.htm# (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
159Fran Spielman, City Council Casts "Wider Net," Expands Gun Offender Registry,
CHI. SuN-TIMES, Mar. 13, 2013 (updated Apr. 15, 2013, 11:19 AM),
http://www.suntimes.com/1 8826999-761/city-council-casts-wider-net-expands-gun-offen
der-registry.html.
160 State v. Phillips, 63 A.3d 51, 68-76 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013).
161 Act Concerning Gun Violence Prevention and Children's Safety, 2013 Conn. Pub.
Act No. 13-3.
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passed and enforced on a municipal level.162 Some municipalities have gone
even further in restricting the movement of individuals with criminal
convictions, forbidding registered sex offenders from entering public libraries
or designating "exclusion zones" prohibiting entry to individuals convicted of
weapons or drug offenses. Municipalities have also experimented with creating
zones that ban individuals arrested or convicted for other crimes, such as drug
possession or prostitution.
Restrictions on housing, employment, and movement for registered sex
offenders are very common among municipalities in the United States,163
imposing some of the harshest collateral consequences on a tiny 64 but highly
stigmatized segment of the population. These restrictions began at the state
level in 1995, when Florida passed a law prohibiting registered sex offenders on
probation for offenses involving minor victims from living within 1000 feet of
schools, parks, day cares, playgrounds, and other places where children
congregate. 165
The first municipal residential restrictions for registered sex offenders were
enacted as amendments to zoning codes. In 1999, Lakewood, Colorado, enacted
the first ordinance prohibiting more than one individual registered as a sex
offender from living in a residence. 166 Soon after, city council members in
nearby Aurora "fast-tracked" similar language, citing fears that sex offenders
from neighboring communities would move to their town: "What I don't want
is for other municipalities to pass laws like this and have them all come to
Aurora," one city council member said.' 67 Within less than a year, at least eight
neighboring towns and counties had passed similar amendments to their zoning
codes. 168
162 OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
AND NOTIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT CASE LAW AND ISSUES 9 (July 2012),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/caselaw/handbookjuly2O12.pdf.
163 Richard Tewksbury, Exile at Home: The Unintended Collateral Consequences ofSex
Offender Residency Restrictions, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 537 (2007) (estimating
that "perhaps hundreds of local communities now have laws that restrict where [registered
sex offenders] may live").
164 As of December 2013, an estimated 769,402 individuals living in the United States
and its territories were required to register as sex offenders, or about 0.25% of the country's
population. NAT'L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, REGISTERED SEX OFFENDERS
IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS TERRITORIES PER 100,000 POPULATION (Dec. 6, 2013),
available at http://www.missingkids.com/en US/documents/SexOffenders Map.pdf.
165 Jill Levenson, Sex Offender Residence Restrictions, in SEX OFFENDER LAws, supra
note 36, at 267, 268.
166 Andrew Guy Jr., Aurora Limits Sex Offenders: Law Prevents Group Homes, DENVER
POST, Oct. 12, 1999, at B2.
167 Andrew Guy Jr., Housing Limits in Works: Aurora Looks To Curb Sex Offender
Numbers, DENVER POST, Sept. 22, 1999, at B2.
168 Karen Rouse, Group Homes at Issue in Douglas County: Commissioners To Vote on
Sex-Offender Limits, DENVER PosT, Sept. 2, 2000, at B8.
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In April 2003, Albuquerque enacted an ordinance that, in addition to
creating a new city registry, 169 created the first municipal residential buffer zone
for individuals convicted of sex offenses, forbidding them from living within
1000 feet of a school. 170 The ordinance was enjoined by a judge for procedural
due process reasons, including that it would require property-owning offenders
to relocate from their current homes, and the Albuquerque City Council quickly
enacted a new ordinance in order to retain most of the restrictions while
addressing the constitutional issues. 171 The revised residency restriction,
prohibiting offenders from newly occupying residences within 1000 feet of a
school, was upheld by the New Mexico Court of Appeals.172
In June 2005, Miami Beach, Florida, enacted a municipal ordinance
expanding residence restrictions to 2500 feet for individuals convicted of sex
offenses, rather than the 1000 foot buffer zone mandated by state law.173
Municipal residential restrictions on sex offenders spread rapidly across the
country.174 By 2007, at least 400 municipalities had enacted such restrictions. 175
In north Texas, for example, about twenty different cities passed residency
restriction ordinances in just over a year.176 In addition to expanding buffer
zones for locations like schools and day cares, many cities enacted additional
residential restrictions around areas frequented by children, such as libraries,
skating rinks, churches, or sports fields.' 77 Some ordinances also prohibited
residences near senior or elderly housing.' 7 8
Other municipalities have sought to build on the popularity of residential
restrictions by prohibiting individuals convicted of sex offenses from "loitering"
near schools or playgrounds and even denying them entry to public spaces such
as parks or libraries.179 For instance, Stephenville, Texas, prohibits sex
169 See supra Part III.B. 1 for details on the Albuquerque registry.
17 0 See Willing, supra note 151.
171 ACLU of N.M. v. City of Albuquerque, 137 P.3d 1215, 1220 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
172Id. at 1228. The court did, however, void other portions of the ordinance, which
required individuals convicted of non-sexually-motivated crimes to register, prohibited
individuals required to register from being alone with any child other than their own child or
grandchild, and required them to submit DNA samples and dental imprints to the
Albuquerque Police Department. Id. at 1232.
173 Levenson, supra note 165, at 270-71.
174 See, e.g., Kelly M. Socia, The Implementation of County Residence Restrictions in
New York, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 206, 207 (2012); Yung, supra note 13, at 125-26.
1 7 5 SANDRA NORMAN-EADY, CAL. OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, SEX OFFENDERS'
RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/rpt/20
07-R-0380.htm.
176See Cassie Dallas, Comment, Not in My Backyard: The Implications ofSex Offender
Residency Ordinances in Texas and Beyond, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1235, 1269 (2009).
1 7 7 BROWARD CNTY. FLA. SEXUAL OFFENDER & SEXUAL PREDATOR RESIDENCE TASK
FORCE, FINAL REPORT 10-11 (Aug. 25, 2009), available at http://www.ilvoices.com/media/4
5c256903el9clafffff8d31ffffe41e.pdf.
178 See, e.g., HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLA., CODE §§ 36-274 to -285 (2013).
179 See Jennifer Ekblaw, Note, Not in My Library: An Examination of State and Local
Bans on Sex Offenders from Public Libraries, 44 IND. L. REV. 919, 927-28 (2011).
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offenders whose offenses involved children from entering libraries, bowling
alleys, movie theaters, and bike trails, or from loitering (defined as "standing
[or] sitting idly") within 300 feet of those facilities. 80 These ordinances often
go far beyond the collateral consequences imposed by state laws; most bans of
sex offenders from libraries, for example, are imposed at the municipal level. 181
As with residency restrictions, exclusionary anti-loitering ordinances tend
to have a "ripple effect" as surrounding towns seek to keep undesirable
individuals from moving into their communities. For example, Orange County,
California, enacted an ordinance in 2011 making it a misdemeanor for a
registered sex offender to enter any county park where children regularly gather
without written permission from the sheriff s office.182 At the urging of county
officials, thirteen cities in Orange County enacted similar anti-loitering
ordinances within a year.183
Alongside the rise of municipal exclusion zones for registered sex
offenders, a handful of municipalities have experimented with exclusion zones
for individuals arrested or convicted of other types of crimes as well.184 Some
of these ordinances have been struck down on constitutional grounds, or
repealed based on concerns about discriminatory enforcement. Nonetheless,
municipalities continue to enact such ordinances, particularly those that target
stigmatized populations such as prostitutes and the homeless.
Portland, Oregon, enacted the first drug exclusion zone ordinance in
1992,185 and created similar prostitution exclusion zones in 1995.186 Cincinnati,
Ohio, followed in 1996 with a drug exclusion ordinance patterned on
Portland's. 187 Drug and prostitution exclusion zone ordinances designate certain
neighborhoods associated with higher incidences of arrests or activity
associated with these crimes. Anyone arrested for a drug or prostitution offense
within one of these zones is banned from all exclusion zones for ninety days
after the arrest, and for a full year after conviction for the crime.188
180 Stephenville, Tex., Ordinance 2007-18 (2007).
181 Ekblaw, supra note 179, at 931.
182 ORANGE COUNTY, CAL., CODE §§ 3-18-1 to -6 (2011).
183 Press Release, Orange Cnty. District Attorney, Orange County District Attorney
Applauds Santa Ana for Expanding Law To Keep Registered Sex Offenders Out of City
Parks and Playgrounds (May 22, 2012), available at http://www.orangecountyda.com/
home/index.asp?page=8&recordid=30 10.
184 See Peter M. Flanagan, Trespass-Zoning: Ensuring Neighborhoods a Safer Future by
Excluding Those with a Criminal Past, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 327, 331-34 (2003).
185 Stuart Tomlinson, Drug-Free Law Goes into Effect in 2 Zones, OREGONIAN, Apr. 29,
1992, at B5.
186 Chastity Pratt, How Prostitute-Free Zones Make Streetwalkers Scram, OREGONIAN,
Dec. 14, 1995, at 1.
187 Flanagan, supra note 184, at 331.
188 Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 119 F. Supp. 2d 735, 736 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
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Unlike sex offender residence restrictions, these ordinances apply to
individuals who have been arrested but not yet convicted.189 As a result, these
exclusion zone ordinances include additional notice and hearing requirements.
Excluded persons are served with notices explaining the exclusion zones and
the right to appeal, and can appeal to the city in writing within five days of
being served.190 Upon appeal, the city has the burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the individual committed the offense.'19 In
addition, excluded persons can apply for a variance from the police chief or
certain social service agencies for reasons including living or working in an
exclusion zone, needing access to drug counseling or other social services, or
other reasons related to their health, welfare, or well-being.192 Without a
variance, however, failure to comply with an exclusion is punishable as a
misdemeanor.193
Drug and prostitution exclusion zone ordinances have been repeatedly
challenged in court, with varying results: While Portland's ordinances have
survived, Cincinnati's drug exclusion zone ordinance was struck down by both
the Supreme Court of Ohio' 94 and the Sixth Circuit.195 Both the Supreme Court
of Ohio and the Sixth Circuit held that Cincinnati's ordinance violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, on the grounds that it infringed
on the liberty right to intrastate travel without being narrowly tailored enough to
allow excluded individuals into the exclusion zone for innocent or socially
beneficial purposes.196 The Sixth Circuit also found that the ordinance violated
the right to freedom of association, noting that it precluded one of the
defendants from caring for her grandchildren and prevented the other from
visiting his attorney.197 On the other hand, Portland's drug and prostitution
exclusion zone ordinances have survived multiple court challenges.198 Courts
have held that the ordinance does not violate double jeopardy protections,
because the exclusions are narrowly tailored enough to provide for variances
and thus are not punitive in nature.199 Portland's ordinance was also found not
189 Cincinnati's ordinance was amended in 1999 to clarify that the ninety-day exclusion





194 State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 868 (Ohio 2001).
195 Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 506 (6th Cir. 2002).
196Id. at 504; Burnett, 755 N.E.2d at 867.
197 Johnson, 310 F.3d at 505-06.
198 State v. Lhasawa, 55 P.3d 477, 479 (Or. 2002) (upholding prostitution exclusion
zone ordinance against double jeopardy challenge); State v. James, 978 P.2d 415, 421-22
(Or. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that drug exclusion zone ordinance did not violate double
jeopardy); State v. Johnson, 988 P.2d 913, 915 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that drug
exclusion zone ordinance did not violate defendant's due process rights).
199 Lhasawa, 55 P.3d at 484-85; James, 978 P.2d at 420.
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to violate procedural due process rights, because defendants were given notice
of their right to appeal the exclusion.200
Despite surviving legal challenges, Portland's drug and prostitution
exclusion zones were allowed to expire in 2007, after a report commissioned by
the mayor's office found that African-Americans were banned from drug
exclusion zones at significantly higher rates than whites and Latinos arrested for
the same crimes. 201 In 2010, however, Portland enacted a new exclusion zone
ordinance, this time targeting individuals arrested for gun offenses. 202
Even in the face of concerns about legal challenges and discriminatory
enforcement, other cities have adopted similar exclusion zone ordinances
focused on "undesirable" populations, particularly prostitution. In Portland,
prostitution exclusion zones have proven less controversial than drug exclusion
zones for several reasons: first, arrests in prostitution exclusion zones are less
racially imbalanced than in drug exclusion zones (although women were
arrested at higher rates); second, the prostitution exclusion zones are more
narrowly drawn.203 Another potential explanation came from Portland's police
chief, who speculated that the public viewed prostitutes even less
sympathetically than drug users.204 A prostitution exclusion zone ordinance
modeled on Portland's was enacted by Charlotte, North Carolina, in 2005.205
Advocates in Atlanta pushing for a similar ordinance also cited their desire to
restrict the movement of "undesirables." 206 A handful of cities in Florida,
including Sarasota and Fort Lauderdale, have also enacted prostitution
exclusion zones banning individuals on probation for prostitution, rather than
merely those arrested for the offense.207
Cities in Oregon have also experimented with exclusion zones that target
another stigmatized population: the homeless. One exclusion zone ordinance
was enacted by Salem, Oregon, in 1993, targeting a range of behaviors
including drug possession, public littering, and unlawful graffiti; in 2007, the
200 Johnson, 988 P.2d at 915.201Drug- and Prostitution-Free Zone Ordinances To Expire, BUS. J. (Portland, Or.),
Sept. 26, 2007; Andy Dworkin, Drug-Free Zones End on Bias Issues, OREGONIAN, Sept. 27,
2007, at Al.
202 Portland Laws Take Aim at "Hot Spot" Gun Areas, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 11,
2010, available at http://www.kgw.com/news/Portland-laws-take-aim-at-hot-spot-gun-areas-
11 1720954.html.
203 Andy Dworkin, Prostitution Zone Enforcement Mostly Affected Whites, Women,
OREGONIAN, Sept. 29, 2007, at B 1.
204 Id.205 CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 15-253 to -260 (2012); Richard Rubin,
Anti-prostitution Zone OK'd: Offenders Arrested in Area off Wilkinson Boulevard Will Be
Barred from Re-Entering, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (N.C.), Mar. 1, 2005, at Bl.
206 Jenny Jarvie, Hometown USA: Atlanta; For Old Crime, an Old Remedy: Banishment,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2013, at Al5.
207See Sandra L. Moser, Anti-prostitution Zones: Justifications for Abolition, 91 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1101, 1101-02 (2001).
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city expanded the ordinance further to specifically target prostitution.208 More
recently, the City of Eugene enacted a "downtown public safety zone"
ordinance in 2008209 after having enacted a prostitution exclusion ordinance
similar to Portland's from 2000.2 10 Anyone arrested within the zone for offenses
such as harassment, providing alcohol to a minor, or public urination or
defecation could be excluded from the twenty-square-block downtown area for
ninety days after arrest and one year after conviction. 211 Despite complaints that
police used the ordinance to unfairly exclude homeless persons from the city's
downtown, the ordinance has been renewed multiple times by Eugene's City
Council. 212
3. The Impact ofRegistration and Exclusionary Zoning
Registration and exclusionary zoning ordinances impose some of the
harshest collateral consequences on individuals with criminal convictions;
failure to comply carries at least a misdemeanor penalty, punished with fines or
incarceration. Limited municipal registries may serve legitimate public safety
purposes by assisting police in identifying and deterring the highest-risk
offenders, but expansive registries with onerous requirements are often
motivated more by a desire to exclude "undesirable" populations. In particular,
registration requirements and other collateral consequences imposed on sex
offenders remain popular even though research has found that they do not deter
or identify individuals at higher risk of reoffending. 213 Albuquerque's registry
monitors individuals convicted of sex offenses over three decades ago, for
instance, despite evidence that sex offenders' risk of reoffending declines the
longer they have been out of prison.214
Going even further, exclusionary zoning ordinances that restrict the housing
and movement of individuals required to register as sex offenders may
208 SALEM, OR., CODE §§ 95.730 to .770 (2012); Jillian Daley, "Crime-Free Zone"
Would Target Salem Prostitution, STATESMAN J. (Salem, Or.), Feb. 26, 2007, at 1; Dennis
Thompson Jr., Police Set Crime Prevention District To Eradicate Prostitution, STATESMAN
J. (Salem, Or.), Sept. 23, 2007, at 1.
2 09 Editorial, Downtown Needs Real Fix, REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Aug. 13,
2008, at A8.
210 EUGENE, OR., ORDINANCE No. 20205 (2000).
211 Editorial, supra note 209.
212 See, e.g., Shannon Finnell, Piercy Backs Exclusion Zone; CLDC To Sue, EUGENE
WKLY., Oct. 10, 2012; Jack Moran, City's Exclusion Zone Gets Another Public Airing,
REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Dec. 11, 2011, at B15.
2 13 See, e.g., RICHARD TEWKSBURY, WESLEY G. JENNINGS & KRISTEN ZGOBA, FINAL
REPORT ON SEX OFFENDERS: RECIDIVISM AND COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 1-3 (Nat'l Inst.
of Justice, Grant #2009-IJ-CX-0203, 2012) (unpublished report), available at https://www.n
cjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/238060.pdf.
214 See, e.g., OHIO OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., REPORT TO THE OHIO CRIMINAL
SENTENCING COMMISSION: SEX OFFENDERS 14 (2006), available at http://www.public
safety.ohio.gov/links/ocjsSexOffenderReport.pdf.
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effectively banish them from the community. 215 Many municipal residential
buffer zone ordinances make it near-impossible to find a permissible residential
location within a town's borders. 216 The effect of these restrictions is
particularly harsh in urban areas, where the concentration of schools, parks, and
day cares may preclude permissible housing in most areas. Miami's residential
restrictions are notoriously so strict that many individuals must live underneath
bridges in order to comply.217 When these ordinances force offenders to cluster
within a small area, neighbors often complain and local governments take
further action to banish sex offenders entirely. The City of Los Angeles, for
example, has built "pocket parks" for the express purpose of driving out
registered sex offenders from specific neighborhoods, based on the residency
restrictions in state law.218 The City of Dyersville, Iowa, went even further in
passing a 2005 ordinance expressly banning sex offenders from residing
anywhere within the city limits.219 After Iowa's governor signed a new state
law in 2009 intended to void local sex offender residence restrictions,
Dyersville's City Council decided to keep the law on the books even as the City
Attorney acknowledged that failure to repeal it would invite a court
challenge. 220
Exclusionary zoning ordinances may actually harm public safety by
isolating individuals far from the services that allow them to avoid reoffending.
For example, the City of Northglenn, Colorado, amended its zoning code to
eliminate group homes for individuals convicted of registerable sex offenses,
even though no reported harm had come from these houses and there was no
evidence that such living arrangements increased recidivism.221 In 2003, the
Colorado Supreme Court invalidated Northglenn's ordinance as applied to
foster youth who had been adjudicated for sex offenses, on the grounds that the
2 15 See Logan, supra note 134, at 19.
216See, e.g., Caitlin J. Monjeau, Note, All Politics Is Local: State Preemption and
Municipal Sex Offender Residency Restrictions in New York State, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1569,
1578 (2011); Tewksbury, supra note 163, at 537-38.
217 Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and
Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 128 n.30 (2009) (citing
Sex Offenders Living Under Miami Bridge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at A22 (describing
how local laws restricting where convicted sex offenders may live forced five men to live
under a bridge and how they "must stay at the bridge from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. because a parole
officer checks on them nearly every night")).
2 18 Ian Lovett, Neighborhoods Seek To Banish Sex Offenders by Building Parks, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2013, at A22.
219 DYERSVILLE, IOWA, CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 49, § 3 (2005), available at
http://www.cityofdyersville.com/CityAdServ/Ordinances/Chapter49.pdf ("A sex offender
shall not reside within the corporate City limits of Dyersville.").
220 Michael Schmidt, Bid To Repeal Dyersville Ordinance Dies, TELEGRAPH HERALD
(Dubuque, Iowa), Jan. 19, 2010, at A3.
221 NORTHGLENN, COLO., ZONING CODE § 11-5-2(b)(58) (2012), available at
http://www.northglenn.org/municode/ch 1/content_ 11-5.html; see Editorial, Housing Sex
Offenders, DENVER PosT, Feb. 20, 2000, at H4; Susan Besze Wallace, Fear Fuels Bans on
Sex-Crime Group Homes, DENVER POST, Jan. 23, 2000, at Al.
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ordinance was preempted by state statutes governing mandatory placement and
supervision for adjudicated delinquent youth in foster care.222 The ordinance
remains on the books for adult offenders, however, with the ruling offering
relief to only about 100 youths throughout the state.223 Other Colorado
communities have retained similar ordinances, despite findings by the Colorado
Sex Offender Management Board that these shared living arrangements could
actually help reduce recidivism for higher-risk adult sex offenders, and that
residency restrictions could be counterproductive by forcing individuals to live
in remote areas far from safe support systems. 224
Even though exclusionary zoning ordinances seriously curtail individuals'
abilities to live and travel in their communities, there is little information
available-even within counties-about which restrictions apply. For example,
California's Proposition 83 enacted highly restrictive 2000-foot buffer zones for
sex offenders' residences in 2006, and also offered express permission for local
jurisdictions to enact even more restrictive ordinances. 225 As a result, within
Los Angeles County alone at least thirty-seven different local ordinances have
been enacted, all with different requirements. 226 A California Sex Offender
Management Board report identified at least eighty-seven separate city or
county ordinances across the state, and concluded that "no one really seems to
have an authoritative picture of how many such ordinances there are, what they
say, who they apply to or to what extent they are enforced." 227
The patchwork of overly restrictive local laws means that law enforcement
may neglect to enforce them consistently, leaving individuals with criminal
convictions in legal limbo. For example, officials in some Pennsylvania towns
stated they had "forgotten the laws were on the books" after passing sex
offender registry restrictions, and only learned about the restrictions after a state
court ruling struck them down.228
222 City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 156-57 (Colo. 2003).223 Editorial, Court Rejects NIAIBY Laws, DENVER POsT, Jan. 15, 2003, at B6.
224See COLO. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, SEX OFFENDER MGMT. BD., REPORT ON SAFETY
ISSUES RAISED BY LIVING ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND LOCATION OF SEX OFFENDERS IN THE
COMMUNITY 3-5 (2004), available at http://dcj.state.co.us/odvsom/sex offender/SO Pdfs/
FullSLAFinal0l.pdf; COLO. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, SEX OFFENDER MGMT. BD., SHARED
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS (SLAS) FACT SHEET 3 (2010), available at http://dcj.state.co.us/
odvsom/sexoffender/SOPdfs/SLA%2OFact%2OSheet.pdf.
225 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5 (West 2006). The statewide residential buffer zone has
been stayed in San Diego as a blanket requirement, based on an appellate court finding that
it essentially bans parolees from the county even if their crimes did not affect children. In re
Taylor, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 64, 82-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), review granted, 290 P.3d 1171,
1171 (Cal. 2013).
226 CAL. SEX OFFENDER MGMT. BD., HOMELESSNESS AMONG CALIFORNIA'S REGISTERED
SEX OFFENDERS: AN UPDATE 8 (2011), available at http://www.casomb.org/docs/Residen
cePaperFinal.pdf.
2271Id.
228 Bill Reed, Ruling Has Towns Easing Megan's Laws, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 3, 2011,
at B 1; see infra Part W.A. 1.
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In some cases, these ordinances have been voided as unconstitutionally
vague 229 or as preempted by state laws governing the registration, residence,
and movement of registered sex offenders. 230 In others, however, these local
ordinances have been upheld as a valid exercise of police power: In North
Carolina, for example, an appeals court rejected a challenge to a town ordinance
prohibiting any registered sex offender from knowingly entering a public town
park.231 In addition, court decisions voiding ordinances on constitutional
grounds rarely prompt other communities to repeal similar ordinances. For
example, the City of Albuquerque's ordinance banning registered sex offenders
from libraries was voided by the Tenth Circuit as violating the plaintiffs First
Amendment right to receive information in a public forum.232 Nonetheless, city
officials in several Massachusetts cities argued that their local ordinances
banning sex offenders from libraries could withstand a potential lawsuit because
they were more narrowly tailored than the Albuquerque ordinance. 233
C. Municipal Background Check Policies
One type of municipal collateral consequence that has recently received
considerable attention, from scholars as well as from policymakers, has been the
exclusion of individuals with criminal records from government
employment.234 Many municipalities impose statutory or regulatory barriers on
employment for individuals with criminal records. 235 Municipal background
check policies may include extensive inquiries into an applicant's arrest and
conviction record for law enforcement jobs and other positions of public
trust;236 bans on convictions for certain specific crimes in positions involving
229 See, e.g., Elwell v. Twp. of Lower, CPM-L-651-05, 2006 WL 3797974, at *18-*19
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Dec. 22, 2006).
230 See, e.g., People v. Oberlander, No. 02-354, 2009 WL 415558, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Jan. 22, 2009).
231 Standley v. Town of Woodfim, 650 S.E.2d 618, 623 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).2 32 Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir. 2012).
233 Ruling Could Affect Restrictions on Sex Offender Use of Mass. Libraries, WBUR
Bos. (Jan. 31, 2012), http://radioboston.wbur.org/2012/01/31/sex-offenders.
234 See, e.g., Jessica S. Henry & James B. Jacobs, Ban the Box To Promote Ex-offender
Employment, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 755, 758 (2007); Michael Sweig & Melissa
McClure, "Moving the Box" by Executive Order in Illinois, 4 DEPAUL J. FOR Soc. JUST. 17,
35-38 (2010); see also LOVE ET AL., supra note 24, at 367-68.
235See LAURA E. JOHNSON & RENATA COBBS FLETCHER WITH CHELSEA FARLEY,
PUBLIC/PRIVATE VENTURES, FROM OPTIONS TO ACTION: A ROADMAP FOR CITY LEADERS To
CONNECT FORMERLY INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS TO WORK 34 (2008) (arguing that cities
and states impose "many statutory and regulatory disqualifications from forms of
employment that have no relationship to the types of crimes committed" and suggesting that
"depending on which local industries have opportunities, cities might want to focus on an
inventory of legal barriers in construction, airport work, hospitality or health care").
236See, e.g., Clinkscale v. City of Phila., No. Civ.A. 97-2165, 1998 WL 372138, at *2
(E.D. Pa. June 16, 1998) (justifying applicant's rejection from the Philadelphia Police
Academy based on prior arrests, even though they did not result in a conviction and were
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financial transactions or classified records;237 broad prohibitions on hiring or
retaining those convicted of crimes of moral turpitude;238 as well as more
general background check requirements for most or all jobs.239 This Section
will discuss the impact of collateral consequences in municipal employment, as
well as legal challenges and recent municipal legislative reforms.
1. Background Check Policies in Municipal Employment
Criminal background checks are a common part of the municipal hiring
process.240 A 2001 survey of municipal employers found that all of them
conducted criminal background checks in hiring public-safety-related personnel
(such as police officers and firefighters), and half conducted such checks on all
prospective hires regardless of position. 241 Heightened security concerns after
9/11 led even more employers to institute background checks.242 In addition,
the trend towards centralizing and automating federal, state, and local court
records databases and making them available online has made it easier for
later expunged, on the grounds that a police officer is granted "almost unlimited authority
over his or her fellow citizens" and thus that "[e]ven an unjustified arrest may be indicative
of character traits that would be undesirable in a police officer, such as a quick temper, poor
attitude or argumentativeness"); Del Rivero v. Cahill, 390 N.E.2d 355, 360 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979) (affirming City of Chicago's exclusion of applicant convicted of driving under the
influence from employment as a police officer based on the job's "peculiar and unusual
position of public trust and responsibility").
237 See, e.g., Mary L. Connerley et al., Criminal Background Checks for Prospective and
Current Employees: Current Practices Among Municipal Agencies, 30 PUB. PERSONNEL
MGMT. 173, 175 (2001).
238See, e.g., United States v. City of Miami, Fla., 614 F.2d 1322, 1342, 1345-46 (5th
Cir. 1980) (upholding a consent decree adopted by the City of Miami allowing the rejection
of applicants for police officer positions who have been convicted of crimes involving
"moral turpitude"); Fortman v. Aurora Civil Serv. Comm'n, 346 N.E.2d 20, 21-22 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1976) (affirming decision to discharge a city sanitation employee on the basis of his
conviction for unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, as a "criminal offense involving
moral turpitude"); Shupe v. Warren Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 99-165, 2000 WL 33340625, at *2
(Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 31, 2000) (discussing school board employment application asking about
prior convictions of violation of law and offenses involving moral turpitude).239 Connerley et al., supra note 237.
2 4 0 SOC'Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., SURVEY FINDINGS: BACKGROUND CHECKING-THE
USE OF CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS IN HIRING DECISIONS 3 (2012). The poll of 544
randomly selected human resources professionals from the government sector, for-profit
organizations, and non-profit organizations found that 69% conduct criminal background
checks on all job candidates, 18% conduct such checks on select job candidates, and 14% do
not conduct such checks on any job candidates. Id.
241 Connerley et al., supra note 237. Many municipal agencies that did not conduct
background checks on all employees nonetheless reported conducting background checks on
positions with responsibilities of a sensitive, confidential, or fiduciary nature.
242 See SEARCH, NAT'L CONSORTIUM FOR JUSTICE INFO. & STATISTICS, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RECORD
INFORMATION 1 (2005); LOVE ET AL., supra note 24, at 56.
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governments-and often members of the public-to view individuals' records
of arrests and convictions within seconds. 243
Federal Title VII caselaw and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) guidance prohibit employers from imposing blanket exclusions on
prior arrests or convictions where such policies impose a disparate impact on
African-American and Hispanic applicants. 244 Individuals with criminal records
are not themselves considered a suspect class, but courts have on occasion
applied the rational-basis test to invalidate state or municipal bans on hiring
anyone with a prior felony conviction. 245 For example, one such blanket ban
imposed by the city charter of Alameda, California was struck down by a
district court on the grounds that there could be no rational basis for a policy
that failed to take into account length of time since a conviction occurred, the
number of convictions, or the nature of the conviction and its relationship to the
type of job sought.246
Across-the-board state and municipal bans on employing individuals with
prior convictions have also been struck down on substantive due process
grounds. In the above-mentioned case, the court also held that the challenged
provision of the Alameda city charter denied the plaintiff substantive due
process, in that it impaired his liberty interest in continued employment without
a rational or nonarbitrary justification for doing so.24 7
While across-the-board bans are discouraged, employers may inquire into
and consider those convictions that are "job related and consistent with business
necessity."248 In recent decades, federal courts have been reluctant to invalidate
employment policies that consider arrest or conviction records, even when
presented with broad policies justified through nebulous references to public
safety or employee morale.249 Legal challenges to municipal agencies' criminal
background check policies are rare, and even more rarely prove successful. 250
243 Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 41, at 183-84; see Anil Kalhan, Immigration Policing
and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1105, 1141-47 (2013).
244 EEOC, supra note 11, at 8-10; see also id. at n.90 (citing Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R.,
549 F.2d 1158, 1160 (8th Cir. 1977)).
245 See Kindem v. City of Alameda, 502 F. Supp. 1108, 1110-11 (N.D. Cal. 1980);
Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 579 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
246 Kindem, 502 F. Supp. at 1111-13.
247Id. at 1113-14.
248 EEOC, supra note 11, at 14.
249 Alexandra Harwin, Title VII Challenges to Employment Discrimination Against
Minority Men with Criminal Records, 14 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 2, 12-13
(2012).
250 Connerley et al., supra note 237, at 177. The survey of municipal agencies found that
84% of responding agencies indicated that their criminal background check policies had not
been legally challenged; the 8% of agencies that had faced a challenge said that they had
successfully defended any complaints in court or from human rights agencies.
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2. The Impact of Municipal Background Check Policies and Legislative
Reforms
The effects of denying or discouraging individuals with criminal
convictions from municipal employment are significant: At least one in ten
people employed in the United States works for local government. 251 While
many municipal jobs may involve public safety or positions of trust, such as
police officers or teachers, others-such as janitorial or office work positions-
should be open to qualified individuals as long as their criminal convictions are
not job related. 252 Studies show that gainful employment helps reduce
recidivism among individuals released from incarceration, suggesting that
governments should encourage employment of such qualified individuals.253
As cities have begun to recognize the need to ease the reentry of individuals
returning from incarceration, many have focused on changing employment
policies that impose barriers on individuals with criminal convictions. 254 A
handful of cities have sought to remedy the situation by enacting anti-
discrimination ordinances that limit the ways in which local government
agencies and other employers may consider an applicant's past arrest or
conviction record in making an employment decision. 255
A more popular approach for cities over the last decade has been to enact
"Ban the Box" ordinances and policies, which reduce barriers to municipal
251 The Employment Situation-January 2014, BUREAU LAB. STAT., at tbl. A-1, tbl. B-2
(Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf (showing that of the 144
million people employed in the United States, about fourteen million of them are employed
by local government).
252 While over half of local government employment is in education, this figure includes
administrative and other personnel working within the school system. 2011 Public
Employment and Payroll Data: Local Governments, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www2.cen
sus.gov/govs/apes/1locus.txt (revised May 2013); see also Current Employee Statistics
Frequently Asked Questions, BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/ces/cesfaq.htm (last
updated Feb. 1, 2013).
253 See, e.g., Mark T. Berg & Beth M. Huebner, Reentry and the Ties that Bind: An
Examination of Social Ties, Employment, and Recidivism, 28 JUST. Q. 382, 387-89 (2011);
CHRISTY A. VISHER & SHANNON M.E. COURTNEY, URBAN INST., ONE YEAR OUT:
EXPERIENCES OF PRISONERS RETURNING TO CLEVELAND 10-11 (2007), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311445 OneYear.pdf; see also Stephen J. Tripodi,
Johnny S. Kim & Kimberly Bender, Is Employment Associated with Reduced Recidivism?:
The Complex Relationship Between Employment and Crime, 54 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY
& COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 706, 713-15 (2010) (finding that individuals who obtained
employment when released from prison were out significantly longer before recidivating
than individuals who did not obtain employment).
254U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, STATUS OF Ex-OFFENDER REENTRY EFFORTS IN
CITIES: A 79-CITY SURVEY 5 (2009), available at http://usmayors.org/pressreleases/uploads/
REENTRYREPORT09.pdf.
255 See, e.g., MADISON, Wis., CODE § 39.03 (2013). Anti-discrimination ordinances,
which often apply to private employers as well, will be discussed in more depth in Part III.D.
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employment for individuals with criminal convictions. 256 Boston enacted the
first "Ban the Box" ordinance in 2004.257 By April 2013, similar ordinances had
been adopted by forty-three cities and counties-including municipalities as
large as Seattle, Washington and as small as Cumberland County, North
Carolina-and had spread to seven states.258 "Ban the Box" ordinances, which
require the removal of the "box" or question about past criminal records from
initial employment applications, are intended to level the playing field by
allowing applicants to be evaluated first based on their credentials without
regard for criminal history.259 Criminal background checks may be conducted
later in the process once an applicant has been deemed qualified for the job, at
the interview or preliminary job offer stage. 260
D. "Third-Party" Collateral Consequences
Some municipalities have enacted ordinances that pass the enforcement of
collateral consequences on to third parties, such as private employers or
landlords, by encouraging or requiring the rejection of individuals with criminal
convictions. Some of these barriers, such as requiring hotels that rent to sex
offenders to obtain an additional license from the county, seem
straightforwardly motivated by a desire to exclude certain "undesirable"
populations from local communities. Broader background check policies can
serve important public-safety purposes but in practice may lead to blanket
rejections of anyone with an arrest or conviction record if they fail to include
responsible guidelines empowering decision-makers to distinguish between
relevant and irrelevant arrests or convictions.
At the same time, some municipalities have sought to reduce barriers
imposed by private employers and landlords by extending "Ban the Box" or
anti-discrimination ordinances. While municipalities without home rule powers
may not be able to regulate private employers and landlords without state
enabling legislation, they may draw on traditional municipal police powers to
enact regulations tied to city contracts or licenses instead. This Section will
discuss municipal ordinances that require private landlords and employers to
conduct background checks or impose collateral consequences, as well as
ordinances that seek to prevent these barriers.
256 LOVE ET AL., supra note 24, at 367-68.
2 5 7 NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, BAN THE Box: MAJOR U.S. CITIES AND COUNTIES
ADOPT FAIR HIRING POLICIES To REMOVE UNFAIR BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE
wrrH CRIMINAL RECORDS 3 (2013), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/495bfld813cadb030d_q
xm6b9zbt.pdf.258 Id. at 1-2.259 Sweig & McClure, supra note 234, at 23-24.
260 LOVE ET AL., supra note 24, at 369.
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1. Landlord Background Checks
A number of municipalities have placed restrictions on private landlords'
ability to rent to individuals with certain criminal convictions. Most ordinances
target individuals convicted of sex offenses, while others include more general
background check requirements through "good landlord" programs.
In an effort to make it as difficult as possible for registered sex offenders to
reside in their communities, some municipalities have enlisted landlords and
property managers to enforce their residency restrictions. Several municipalities
have enacted ordinances making it a misdemeanor for landlords to rent
residences to sex offenders that would run afoul of the residency restrictions. 261
For example, Hillsborough County, Florida, prohibits more than one unrelated
sex offender from living in a single residence, and further holds private
landlords, real estate agents, or apartment complex managers accountable for
enforcement by prohibiting them from having an unlawful number of sex
offenders residing on any property they control. 262
Other municipalities have targeted hotels and motels, as strict residency
restrictions have forced individuals convicted of sex offenses to move to
transient housing. Because of the scarcity of legally permissible housing, as
well as the stigma of sex offenses, sex offenders often cluster in the rare hotel or
motel where managers are willing to rent to them.263 As a result, after New
York courts voided several counties' sex offender residence restriction
ordinances in 2009 on the grounds that they were preempted by state law,264
several towns and counties responded by requiring hotel and motel owners to
pay for licenses if they rent rooms to sex offenders.265 Similarly, Riverside
County, California, limits the number of rooms that a hotel or motel may rent to
registered sex offenders to no more than six rooms or ten percent of the facility,
whichever is less.266 The ordinance, which makes violations a misdemeanor
offense, was passed on an emergency basis in order to block the state's plan to
261 See, e.g., RIVERSIDE COUNTY, CAL., CODE §§ 9.55.010 to .130 (2010).262 HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLA., CODE §§ 36-304 to -310 (2012).263 See Sofia Santana & Dana Williams, 24 Sex Offenders Lived at Budget Inn-Housing
Dilemma, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), June 22, 2011, at Al.
264 See Doe v. Rensselaer Cnty., No. 223240, 2009 WL 2340873, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
June 29, 2009) (invalidating Rensselaer County sex offender buffer zone law as preempted
by New York State law); People v. Oberlander, No. 02-354, 2009 WL 415558, at *4 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 2009) (invalidating Rockland County sex offender buffer zone law as
preempted by New York state law); People v. Blair, 873 N.Y.S.2d 890, 892, 897 (Albany
City Ct. 2009) (invalidating Albany County sex offender buffer zone law as preempted by
New York state law).
265 See, e.g., QUEENSBURY, N.Y., CODE §§ 44-1 to -20 (2013); see also SUFFOLK
COUNTY, N.Y., CODE §§ 745-16 to -21 (2013) (requiring sex offenders to disclose their sex
offender status when renting rooms in hotels or motels); Dave Lucas, NY Counties Enact Sex
Offender Residency Laws, WAMC NORTHEAST PUB. RADIO (Apr. 27, 2010, 2:46 PM),
http://wamc.org/post/ny-counties-enact-sex-offender-residency-laws.
266 RIERSIDE COUNTY, CAL., CODE § 9.55.060(c) (2010).
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release an individual convicted of a high-profile rape and murder into a group
home in the community.267
In Utah, municipalities have enacted "good landlord" ordinances that
charge fees to private landlords who do not conduct background checks or
reject tenants with certain types of criminal convictions. 268 These municipal
ordinances were enabled by state law, which permitted municipalities to collect
disproportionate rental fees if they established a "good landlord" program
allowing landlords to avoid the higher fees provided they completed a training
program and implemented "measures to reduce crime in rental housing."269
Most such municipal programs have required private landlords to reject
individuals with certain types of criminal records. 270 For example, the City of
West Jordan requires landlords to reject any prospective tenant who "[w]ithin
the past 3 years has been convicted of any drug or alcohol related crime, any
crime related to theft or property damage, prostitution, lewdness, violence of
any kind, assault, or crimes that involve weaponry of any kind" as well as
registered sex offenders.271 Similarly, Ogden City's program requires
participating landlords to conduct criminal background checks and to refuse to
rent to any individual "convicted of any crime involving any threat or damage
to property or person" within the previous four years.272 While the program is
voluntary, landlords who do complete the training and agree to comply with the
terms of the program receive a ninety percent fee reduction, potentially worth
hundreds or thousands of dollars. 273 Moreover, the city may revoke the
"discount" if the police department reports that a landlord has failed to comply
with program requirements, aided by a search of police or court records. 274
Utah municipal leaders have been open about the exclusionary purposes
served by "good landlord" ordinances. For example, the police department
justified the West Jordan program in part by arguing that it "[d]iscourages the
criminal element from residing in West Jordan." 275 The executive director of
the Utah Apartment Association, a key advocate in passing the state enabling
legislation, stated that good landlord programs are "[a]bsolutely ... designed to
267 Paul Young, County Clamps Down on Where Parolees Can Stay, CITY NEWS
SERVICE (Southern Calif.), July 27, 2010.268 See Patrick B.N. Solomon, Utah's New Extermination Orders, 26 BYU J. PUB. L.
111, 112 (2011).269 UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-1-203.5(1)(f)(i)(B)(ii) (West 2013).
270 Solomon, supra note 268, at 119-21.
271Id. at 121 (quoting Good Landlord Program, W. JORDAN, http://www.wjordan.com/
Business.aspx?pglD=30.1 (last visited Feb. 7, 2014)).
272 GOOD LANDLORD INCENTIVE PROGRAM, OGDEN CITY, UTAH, § 1745-4, www.ogden
city.com/en/sitecore/content/Global/Content/DocumentLinks/Business/Ordinance%201745
%20-%2OGood%20Landlord%20Incentive%20Program.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).
273 Solomon, supra note 268, at 119.
274Id. at 120-21.
27 5Minutes of the City of West Jordan City Council Meeting 15 (Sept. 8, 2009),
www.wjordan.com/Files/City/o20Clerk/2009%20Minutes/September/208,%202009.pdf.
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discriminate against criminals. .. [W]e reduce crime by not renting to criminals
in the first place." 276
2. Employer Background Checks
Similar to ordinances governing private landlords, most municipal
ordinances that discourage private employers from hiring individuals with
criminal convictions specifically target individuals convicted of sex offenses.
Palm Bay, Florida, has made it a misdemeanor for employers within the city
limits to allow a registered sex offender whose offense involved a minor or
vulnerable adult to work in facilities including school bus stops, libraries, parks,
homes, or any "other place where children or vulnerable adults may reside or
regularly congregate." 277 Similarly, Albuquerque requires that these individuals
must affirmatively notify their private employers of their sex offender status. 278
Municipalities may also regulate the hiring practices of contractors to
discourage the employment of individuals with prior convictions. Municipal
ordinances commonly bar individuals with criminal records from applying for
government contracts, 279 and may also require that city contractors conduct
background checks on their employees. 280
3. The Impact of "Third-Party" Collateral Consequences and Legislative
Reforms
Background-check policies of private landlords and employers can
substantially impair the ability of individuals with criminal convictions to live
and work within their communities. In turn, a lack of opportunities for housing
and employment can have significant effects on public safety. Stable housing
and employment have been shown to help reduce recidivism among individuals
released from incarceration. 281  Recognizing these obstacles, some
municipalities have enacted ordinances that prohibit discrimination by private
landlords or employers on the basis of an applicant's arrest or conviction record.
276Ace Stryker, Cleanup or Shakedown: Provo Rental Ordinance Under Microscope,
DAILY HERALD (Provo, Utah) (June 28, 2008, 11:00 PM), http://www.heraldextra.com/news/
local/cleanup-or-shakedown-provo-rental-ordinance-under-microscope/article-f9e26c84-
3dc9-5714-a320-03f07c3clf8c.html.
277 PALM BAY, FLA., CODE §§ 134.10 to .12 (2005).
2 7 8 ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE §§ 11-12-1-1 to -6 (2013) (requiring probationary sex
offenders to notify their employers of their offender status).
279 LOVE ET AL., supra note 24, at 60; see, e.g., FOLEY, ALA., CODE § 2-8 (2013)
(automatically disqualifying from contracting with the city any company owned or run by an
individual convicted of a variety of felonies, including use or possession of a controlled
substance).
280 See, e.g., ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE § 11-12-2-7 (2013) (requiring city contractors
to conduct background searches of any employees "that may be alone with a child").
28 1NAT'L HOUsING LAW PROJECT, supra note 7, at 5; see also sources cited supra note
253.
39
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
While anti-discrimination ordinances have not spread widely, the popularity of
"Ban the Box" ordinances has encouraged some municipalities to extend their
policies to private employers as well.
A handful of municipalities in Illinois and Wisconsin have enacted anti-
discrimination ordinances that limit private landlords' ability to deny tenants on
the basis of arrest or conviction records, with mixed results; the Wisconsin state
legislature has curtailed such ordinances while the Illinois state legislature took
affirmative steps to allow them.
Madison, Wisconsin, has long banned housing discrimination by public or
private landlords against individuals on the basis of their arrest or conviction
records, as part of an overall anti-discrimination ordinance designating
individuals with arrest or conviction records as a protected class. 282 Appleton,
Wisconsin, has banned housing discrimination on the basis of arrest or
conviction records as well.283 The county in which Madison is located, Dane
County, also passed a fair housing ordinance prohibiting landlords from
discriminating against tenants on the basis of an arrest or conviction record as
long as the conviction is over two years old.284 These ordinances had a
significant impact: From 2005 to 2010, the third most common type of fair
housing complaint in Dane County was based on an arrest or conviction
record.285 In 2011, however, the State of Wisconsin passed a law expressly
prohibiting municipalities from placing limitations on landlords' ability to
evaluate the arrest or conviction records of tenants or prospective tenants. 286
In Illinois, two neighboring municipalities, Urbana287 and Champaign, 288
have ordinances prohibiting housing discrimination on the basis of arrest or
conviction records. Like Madison's ordinance, both cities prohibit housing
discrimination as part of an overall anti-discrimination ordinance that expressly
protects individuals with arrest or conviction records. The ordinances also
protect against discrimination in credit, access to public accommodations, and
employment. 289 Urbana's anti-discrimination ordinance, enacted in 1979, was
initially held to be preempted by state laws where its protections went beyond
those offered by the state.290 The Illinois state legislature quickly responded,
282 MADISON, WIS., CODE § 39.03 (2013).283 APPLETON, WIS., CODE § 8-30 (2012).284 DANE COUNTY, WIs., CODE §§ 31.01 to 31.99 (2012); see also Matt DeFour, Dane
County Tightens Housing Discrimination Ordinance, WIS. ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2009), http://host.
madison.com/wsj/article_1bf94768-9908-11 de-b7d3-001cc4c03286.html.
2 8 5 MAXFIELD RESEARCH INC., ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS TO FAIR HOUSING CHOICE IN
DANE COUNTY, WISCONSIN 81-82 (2010), available at http://pdf.countyofdane.com/human
services/cdbg/20 11/analysis of impediments to fair housing-choice 2011 final.pdf.
286 See Wis. STAT. § 66.0104 (2011) (Act relating to prohibiting ordinances that place
certain limits or requirements on landlords).287 URBANA, ILL., CODE § 12-37 (2003).288 CHAMPAIGN, ILL., CODE §§ 17-2, 17-71 (1985).289 URBANA, ILL., CODE § 12-61; CHAMPAIGN, ILL., CODE §§ 17-36, 17-56, 17-58.
290 Hutchcraft Van Serv., Inc. v. City of Urbana Human Relations Comm'n, 433 N.E.2d
329, 334 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
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however, by amending the law to expressly permit home rule cities (including
Urbana and Champaign) to enact broader anti-discrimination policies than those
under state law. 291 Despite the encouragement of the Illinois state legislature,
however, no new Illinois municipal ordinances have since been enacted to
prohibit housing discrimination on the basis of arrest or conviction records.292
In fact, Champaign limited its housing discrimination provisions in 1994 to
allow landlords to reject individuals for forcible felony or drug convictions
within the last five years. 293
Municipalities seeking to reduce barriers faced by individuals with criminal
records have had more success with ordinances that regulate private employers
rather than private landlords. For example, Madison's anti-discrimination
ordinance also prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of arrest or
conviction records if the record is over three years old or the charge does not
substantially relate to the circumstances of the job; the employment
discrimination portions of the ordinance remain unchanged by state law.294
Similarly, Boston, Massachusetts, has banned employment discrimination on
the basis of arrests without conviction and certain misdemeanor records.295
Urbana and Champaign, Illinois, both prohibit employment discrimination on
the basis of arrest or conviction records except for when based on bona fide
occupational qualifications. 296
Much of the recent trend, however, has been for municipalities to encourage
city contractors or private employers to hire individuals with criminal
convictions through the extension of "Ban the Box" ordinances. At least eleven
municipalities, including cities like New Haven, Connecticut,297 and
Jacksonville, Florida,298 have enacted ordinances requiring city contractors to
comply with "Ban the Box" guidelines mandating the removal of questions
about arrest or conviction records from initial employment applications.299
Going further, Newark300 and Philadelphia 301 have extended their ordinances
requiring "Ban the Box" guidelines in hiring to apply to private employers
operating within .city limits as well. States have begun to follow the trend:
291 Page v. City of Chi., 701 N.E.2d 218, 226 (111. App. Ct. 1998).292 See Local Anti-discrimination Ordinances, NAT'L HouSING L. PROJECT,
http://nhlp.org/node/1528 (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
293 CHAMPAIGN, ILL., CODE § 17-75(e); see Tom Pelton, Criminals Need Not Apply:
Landlords Want To Know Tenants, CHI. TRIB., July 24, 1994.294 MADISON, Wis., CODE § 39.03(8)(i)(3) (2013).295 Bos., MASS., CODE §§ 12-9.1 to .15 (2012).296 URBANA, ILL., CODE §§ 12-61 to -62 (2012); CHAMPAIGN, ILL., CODE §§ 17-36 to -40
(2012).
297 NEW HAVEN, CONN., CODE § § 2-851 to -856 (2012).
298 JACKSONVILLE, FLA., CODE § 126.112 (2011).
299 NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, supra note 257, at 1-2.
300 Newark, N.J., Ordinance 12-1630 (Sept. 19, 2012).
301 PHILA., PA., CODE §§ 9-3501 to -3507 (2013).
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Minnesota recently expanded its "Ban the Box" law to cover private
employers. 302
IV. OPTIONS FOR REFORM
The collateral consequences imposed by municipal ordinances can have
devastating effects on individuals with criminal convictions, preventing them
from working, living, moving freely, or participating in public life in their local
communities. It may be particularly difficult for individuals facing criminal
charges to obtain information about municipal collateral consequences, given
that a person may live and work in multiple cities, towns, and counties within a
single state. In addition, the variety of municipal collateral consequences can
lead to a haphazard tangle of regulations within a single state. Exclusionary
zoning ordinances, for example, may create a patchwork of impermissible areas
that affected individuals find near-impossible to navigate. States can mitigate
this issue by passing laws that clearly preempt or limit municipal powers to
regulate in areas, such as sex offender residence registration, where
municipalities have gone far beyond state law in attempting to banish these
stigmatized populations.
At the same time, municipalities seeking to mitigate collateral consequences
can lead the way for states in enacting modified portions of the UCCCA. As
with "Ban the Box" ordinances, municipalities can serve as "proving grounds"
for policies that set uniform standards and inform the public about local
collateral consequences.
A. State Law Reforms for Municipal Collateral Consequences
Because cities derive their powers from states, one way for states to address
the increasing patchwork of municipal collateral consequences is to preempt or
limit municipal powers to regulate in this area. Municipal ordinances are
frequently challenged as reaching beyond their state-granted powers or
preempted by state law, as both state laws and municipal ordinances impose a
wide variety of collateral consequences.
1. Preemption
Preemption is a common issue raised regarding collateral consequences
imposed on the local level. If a local ordinance conflicts with a state law, or
addresses an area where the state has already enacted a general law or a
comprehensive set of regulations suggesting state supremacy on the matter, then
the local ordinance is preempted by the state. 303 On the other hand, if the local
3022013 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 61 (West).
303 SANDRA M. STEVENSON, ANTIEAU LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 22.05 (Sandra M.
Stevenson ed., 2d ed. 2005).
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ordinance complements the goals furthered by the state law, then the local
ordinance may not be preempted even if it addresses the same matters as the
state law.304
When a municipal ordinance imposes collateral consequences in addition to
those imposed by state law, then, the question is whether the additional
sanctions imposed by the municipality conflict with or complement the state's
sanctions. Courts must determine whether state legislators intended to impose a
minimum set of sanctions on which municipalities could expand, or to delineate
the entire permissible set of sanctions. For example, some courts have allowed
municipalities to require licenses governing the same professions as states, even
where the required licensing qualifications are more restrictive than state law,
while others have interpreted state licensing regulations as preempting the entire
field.305
Collateral consequences in licensing have also been challenged as
preempted by state law, either because they go beyond those imposed by state
law or on the grounds that they conflict with state anti-discrimination laws that
set standards for when employment or licensing can be denied based on
criminal records. For example, one court upheld the City of San Diego's
authority to require pawnbrokers to obtain a local permit in addition to the state
license required by California law.306 The court voided sections of the
ordinance that allowed the city to deny or revoke a local permit based on a
single violation of state law, however, on the grounds that it conflicted with the
state law allowing denial only if violations formed a pattern of conduct.307
Similarly, a Texas appellate court found that state anti-discrimination laws
preempted a Dallas ordinance authorizing the denial of a taxicab driver's license
for applicants with a theft conviction within the past five years. Because the
state law only allowed for license denials when the criminal conviction was
directly related to the duties and responsibilities of the licensed occupation, the
court held that the city code could not impose a mandatory denial for theft
convictions occurring within a specific time frame.308
Preemption is also commonly raised in challenges of exclusionary zoning
ordinances because most states, as well as many cities, have enacted laws
restricting the housing and movement of sex offenders. Ever since some of the
earliest municipal registration ordinances were struck down as preempted by
state law, 309 municipal registration and exclusionary zoning ordinances have
been challenged on preemption grounds. Recent litigation over municipal sex
offender residency restrictions has produced mixed results: courts in New
3 04 See id.
305 George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint upon the Exercise of
Municipal Power in Home Rule, 24 STETSON L. REv. 417, 429-30 (1995).
3 06 Malish v. City of San Diego, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 18, 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
307 Id. at 22-27.
3 08 Johnson v. City of Dall., 702 S.W.2d 291, 292 (Tex. App. 1985).
309 Abbott v. City of L.A., 349 P.2d 974, 982 (Cal. 1960); State v. Ulesky, 252 A.2d
720, 722-23 (N.J. 1969); see also supra Part IIB. 1.
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York,310 New Jersey, 311 Pennsylvania,312 and ColoradO313 have invalidated
such ordinances on the grounds of preemption, while courts in Florida314 have
found that no conflict or preemption exists. Despite the many court challenges,
municipalities have often declined to repeal sex-offender residency restrictions
even in the face of state court rulings voiding similar ordinances. In such states,
municipalities often split between repealing and leaving such ordinances on the
books,315 leading to additional confusion about whether collateral consequences
may apply in a given situation.
At least two states have taken affirmative measures to preempt the
proliferation of municipal sex offender residency restrictions. New Mexico
passed a state law in 2005 expressly preempting the field of sex offender
registration and notification in order to keep local ordinances from proliferating,
but it did allow existing local ordinances to remain in effect as long as they did
not conflict with state law. 316 More recently, the law was expanded to preempt
municipalities from imposing additional restrictions on sex offenders, including
requirements to register more frequently or to provide additional information to
law enforcement. 317 In 2009, Iowa passed a state law that voided all local
3 10 See sources cited supra note 264; see also Moore v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 851 F. Supp.
2d 447, 457 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) ("Every court that has considered the state preemption issue to
date has found that New York State's legislative scheme concerning sex offenders preempts
the local laws."); Terrance v. Geneva, 799 F. Supp. 2d 250, 257 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (declaring
Geneva sex offender buffer zone ordinance invalid on preemption grounds).
311 G.H. v. Twp. of Galloway, 401 N.J. Super. 392, 407, 421 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
2008), aff'd, 199 N.J. 135, 136 (2009) (invalidating sex offender residential restriction
ordinances in Galloway Township and Cherry Hill Township as preempted by New Jersey
state law, in part because the exclusionary effects of the buffer zones interfered with state
parole officers' mandate to find appropriate housing for offenders).
3 12 Fross v. City. of Allegheny, 20 A.3d 1193, 1206-07 (Pa. 2010) (holding that
Allegheny County's broad residential restrictions were contrary to the state scheme, which
balanced more limited restrictions with "individually tailored assessments and assistance
with rehabilitation and reintegration for appropriate offenders").
313 City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 156 (Colo. 2003) (holding that the City of
Northglenn's ordinance, as it applied to prohibiting multiple children adjudicated as sex
offenders from living in a single foster care home, was preempted by "[t]he state's interest in
fulfilling its statutory obligations to place and supervise adjudicated delinquent children in
foster care homes pursuant to uniform, statewide criteria").
314 Exile v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 35 So. 3d 118, 119 (Fla. 2010); see also Calderon v.
State, 93 So. 3d 439, 440-41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
3 15 Compare Joyce M. Miles, Sex Offender Residency Limits Gone, LOCKPORT UNION-
SUN & J., Aug. 2, 2012 (discussing repeal of municipal ordinances in New York), with Reed,
supra note 228, at B1 (quoting a lawyer with the American Civil Liberties Union of
Pennsylvania: "In these kinds of cases, towns usualfy don't repeal their laws."), and Barbara
Williams, Sex Offender Redlines Erased; Conforms to Supreme Court Ruling, HERALD
NEWS (Passaic County, N.J.), Nov. 17, 2009, at BI (noting that over 125 New Jersey
communities had enacted sex offender residency restrictions, and that they "have split on
repealing their local ordinances" since the Supreme Court ruling).
316 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-11A-9 (2012).
317 H.B. 570, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2013) (effective date Jan. 1, 2014).
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ordinances restricting the residence or movement of registered sex offenders,318
even as it added new restrictions banning registered sex offenders from being
present in schools, libraries, playgrounds, and other public areas. 319
On the other hand, some states have passed laws that only encourage the
patchwork of harsh municipal collateral consequences to spread. For example,
California's Proposition 83 expressly allowed local jurisdictions to enact even
more restrictive sex offender residency restrictions, leading to over eighty-seven
separate city or county ordinances across the state.320 Similarly, Ohio has
enacted a statute expressly permitting local jurisdictions to pass sex offender
residency ordinances that are more restrictive than state law. The City of
Newark, Ohio, responded by passing an ordinance restricting sex offenders
from living within 1000 feet of city parks and the municipal swimming pool, in
addition to the buffer zones created by the state law. The ordinance proved so
restrictive that in order to enforce it, the city's Law Director became "something
of a real-estate agent for sex offenders," checking addresses weekly for about
100 individuals against a software mapping program to ensure compliance. 321
2. Limits ofMunicipal Power
Because cities are creatures of state power, another way for states to reduce
the patchwork of collateral consequences in a given regulatory area is to limit
the power municipalities have to pass such regulations. Court challenges to
municipal ordinances may address the question of whether the state has granted
municipalities the power to regulate in this area at all.322 Courts have long held
that local governments have the power to regulate businesses, occupations, and
professions that make use of public property (such as roads, sidewalks, and
parks) as well as those susceptible to causing nuisances or harm to public
safety. 323 On the other hand, states often limit the power of municipalities to
impose penalties for violating an ordinance that go beyond those allowed in
state statute.324 Where municipal ordinances impose collateral consequences
enforced by penalties, such as exclusion zones or residential restrictions, they
may extend beyond their state-granted powers.
For example, the Supreme Court of Ohio invalidated Cincinnati's drug
exclusion zone ordinance based in part on its finding that the ordinance added a
criminal penalty for drug offenses that was not imposed through sentencing or
3 18 IOWA CODE § 692A.127 (2010).
3 19 Id. § 692A.113.320 CALIF. SEX OFFENDER MGMT. BD., supra note 226, at 8.
321 Mary Beth Lane, Sex-Offender Ghettos: Get-Tough Laws Force Predators To Move
but Do Little To Make Kids Safer, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 7, 2007, at A10.
322 See, e.g., City of Akron v. Williams, 177 N.E.2d 802, 805 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960)
(finding that city had power to enact municipal ordinance prohibiting individual with felony
record from possession of firearm).
323 See, e.g., Tarver v. City Comm'n of Bremerton, 435 P.2d 531, 535 (Wash. 1967).
324 See MCQUILLIN, supra note 69, § 17:15.
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authorized by state statute. 325 Similarly, the Texas Attorney General issued an
opinion in 2007 finding that the state's home-rule municipalities had the
authority to enact residential restrictions on registered sex offenders, but that
general-law municipalities did not.326 Despite this opinion, many of the thirty
general-law municipalities that already had these ordinances did not repeal
them.327
3. What States Can Do
While numerous municipal ordinances that impose collateral consequences
have been voided on the grounds that they are preempted or go beyond the
powers granted in state law, states have rarely taken affirmative steps to
eliminate the patchwork of harsh collateral consequences imposed by
municipalities. As a result, state and local decision-makers may be unaware of
the barriers posed by the tangle of regulations across the state, particularly for
sex offender residency restrictions. 328 With budgets ballooning from the costs
of incarceration, however, some states have increasingly sought to lower
reoffending rates among individuals released from incarceration through
policies that reduce barriers to their successful reintegration.329
Some state legislatures have begun to address collateral consequences,
passing "Ban the Box" laws as well as new laws that help individuals expunge
old criminal records or seek relief from specific collateral consequences. 330
Several states, including New York and Mississippi, have passed laws in recent
years to expand eligibility to expunge or seal criminal records. 331 In addition to
North Carolina's partial passage of the UCCCA, Ohio passed a "collateral
sanctions" law, which creates certificates of rehabilitation to assist individuals
seeking relief from specific collateral consequences, and also changes the
criminal background check requirements for licensing.332
State legislatures interested in mitigating unnecessary collateral
consequences could repeal laws that allow municipalities to enact harsh
ordinances such as those restricting where registered sex offenders can live, and
enact laws explicitly preempting such ordinances instead. States can also
32 5 State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 868 (Ohio 2001).326 Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0526 (Mar. 6, 2007).
327 Dallas, supra note 176, at 1266; see also LAWREN FORD CRAWFORD, TEx. MuN.
LEAGUE LEGAL COUNSEL, LEGAL Q&A 2 (June 2008), available at http://www.tml.org/legal-
qna/2008June-LFC.pdf.328 CALF. SEX OFFENDER MGMT. BD., supra note 226, at 8.329 See, e.g., Jason Chaffetz, Commentary, Getting Smart About Crime, WASH. TIMES,
July 15, 2013; Steven Greenhouse, States Help Find Work (and Hope) for Ex-Convicts, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011, at BI.
330 See supra Part III.C.2.
33 1ERIN KINCAID & ALISON LAWRENCE, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
EX-OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 3 (2011), available at http://www.ncsl.org/docu
ments/cj/pew/ex-offenderreport.pdf.332 S.B. 337, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2012 Ohio Laws 131.
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preempt municipalities' blanket bans on criminal records in licensing and
employment by passing laws setting standards for when these benefits may be
denied on the basis of a relevant criminal record. When such laws clearly state
an intent to preempt local action, they can mitigate collateral consequences
imposed at the state as well as at the municipal level. For example, courts in
some cities have overturned municipal policies mandating the denial of licenses
for taxicabs or rooming houses based on criminal convictions, on the grounds
that such policies conflict with state anti-discrimination laws. 333
On the other hand, some states have preempted or limited municipal
ordinances with state laws that create even harsher restrictions on individuals
with criminal records. As noted above, Wisconsin enacted a law to preempt
local ordinances prohibiting landlords from discriminating against tenants on
the basis of arrest records.334 Advocates seeking state action to address
municipal collateral consequences should begin, of course, by assessing the
state's political climate. Moreover, advocates should survey municipal
ordinances and policies within the state to ensure that state action will not
simply impose harsher, albeit more uniform, collateral consequences across the
state. These concerns may be particularly relevant for policies-such as
exclusionary zones for sex offenders-that impact highly stigmatized
populations.
B. Using Municipal Ordinances To Address Collateral Consequences
The impact of collateral consequences in municipal ordinances suggests a
new avenue for advocates: using cities and counties as "proving grounds"335 for
laws that collect and provide relief from collateral consequences. Municipal
collateral consequences ordinances will not only help to inform local residents,
attorneys, and judges about relevant collateral sanctions; they can also help to
build support for similar policies in other cities and at the state level.
The success of "Ban the Box" ordinances suggests that many municipalities
recognize the barriers that collateral consequences pose for individuals with
criminal convictions. Municipalities can build on "Ban the Box" ordinances by
enacting ordinances that, as with municipal employment, outline the standards
333 See, e.g., Standow v. City of Spokane, 564 P.2d 1145, 1152-53 (Wash. 1977)
(overruled on other grounds by State v. Smith, 610 P.2d 869, 874 n.2 (Wash. 1980)); Marra
v. City of White Plains, 467 N.Y.S.2d 865, 869-70 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); see also Peluso
v. Smith, 540 N.Y.S.2d 631, 636 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (directing New York City's
Department of Personnel to "hold a fact-finding evidentiary hearing ... to examine, apply
and determine the applicability of the factors set forth" in New York's state law governing
the use of criminal convictions in employment and licensing decisions before making a
decision regarding the plaintiffs application for a site safety manager license).
334 Wis. STAT. § 66.0104 (2011).
335 Paul A. Diller, The Partly Fulfilled Promise ofHome Rule in Oregon, 87 OR. L. REV.
939, 957 (2008) (quoting Sims v. Besaw's Cafe, 997 P.2d 201, 213 n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 2000)
(Linder, J., concurring)).
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that must be met for imposing collateral consequences in areas such as licensing
for an individual with a relevant criminal conviction. Such ordinances should
also commit the municipality to collect and publish the collateral consequences
in the municipal code, both for transparency in governmental decision-making
and to better inform community members and their attorneys about the possible
consequences they face. Collecting municipal collateral consequences is
particularly important because-unlike at the state and federal level-there is
no concerted effort already underway to research these issues. Compiling
municipal collateral consequences may also build pressure to repeal those
consequences that serve exclusionary rather than public safety purposes. In
addition, municipalities that criminalize municipal ordinance violations should
explore the potential for creating their own mechanisms for expunging
municipal criminal records.
This Section will outline key issues for municipalities to consider in
enacting collateral consequences policies, offering the example of the first
municipal collateral consequences ordinance enacted in 2012 by New Haven,
Connecticut. Inspired by the UCCCA, New Haven's collateral consequences
ordinance sets standards for imposing collateral consequences and commits to
collecting, publishing, and annually updating the collateral consequences found
in the city's municipal code. Furthermore, this Section will argue that the
success of "Ban the Box" policies helped to ensure the passage of New Haven's
ordinance, and that advocates can build on these successes to pass similar
collateral consequences ordinances in other cities.
1. Municipal Standards for Imposing Collateral Consequences
One of the most important purposes of a municipal collateral consequences
policy is to set standards for when arrest or conviction records are considered
relevant and when they are not. Municipalities have taken a variety of
approaches in setting standards for linking collateral consequences to relevant
criminal history, including offering more general guidelines as in the UCCCA;
setting out factors to consider as in many "Ban the Box" ordinances; or
protecting certain types of arrest or conviction records from consideration under
anti-discrimination ordinances.
The UCCCA offers general guidelines for when governmental decision-
makers may consider a criminal record to be relevant. First, the UCCCA
provides that when a law creating a collateral consequence is ambiguous as to
whether it is mandatory or discretionary, it must be construed as
discretionary. 336 Second, the UCCCA requires that when the municipality
imposes a discretionary collateral consequence, the decision-maker undertake
an individualized assessment that considers any circumstances and elements of
the offense relevant to the benefit or opportunity in question, as well as the
effect of the decision on third parties and any certificates granting relief from
336 UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT § 7 (2010).
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the collateral consequence. 337 New Haven's collateral consequences ordinance
includes these general guidelines to be used in decision-making for all collateral
consequences imposed by city government, as well as the specific "Ban the
Box" factors for licensing.
"Ban the Box" ordinances, which mitigate collateral consequences relating
to employment, often set specific standards by which public or private
employers must weigh the relevance of an applicant's criminal record to the
position sought. For example, the "Ban the Box" ordinances passed by
Memphis and New Haven require that decision-makers consider several factors
in making a determination about whether a prior conviction is relevant to a job:
the nature of the crime and its relationship to the job; information about
rehabilitation; the length of time elapsed; the applicant's age at the time of the
offense; and the gravity of the offense.338 These factors offer a standard for
responsible decision-making regarding an individual's criminal record for any
collateral consequence, not simply employment. New Haven's collateral
consequences ordinance provides the same factors for relevance in a criminal
record for licensing purposes.
Another approach, illustrated by ordinances in Boston, Madison, Urbana,
Champaign, and New York City, is to add arrest or conviction records to the list
of protected classes in the municipal anti-discrimination ordinance. 339 Because
these ordinances generally allow discrimination based on arrest or conviction
records in situations where the conviction is recent and/or relevant to the benefit
or right in question, they may also delineate specific types of arrest or
conviction records which may or may not be considered. For example, Boston
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of arrests without conviction,
convictions for certain misdemeanors including simple assault or disturbing the
peace, or misdemeanor convictions over five years old.340 One advantage of
guidelines that specifically state lengths of time and types of convictions is that
they provide clear instructions to decision-makers and are transparent for
applicants. On the other hand, overly specific guidelines may hinder decision-
makers' ability to make nuanced judgments based on a variety of factors. For
example, Boston's ordinance clearly protects a job applicant whose
misdemeanor convictions are less than five years old, but not one whose record
is just a few days more recent. Another drawback of specifying certain types of
convictions is that they risk falling out of date with changes in state criminal
laws, or providing uneven protection to individuals convicted of similar crimes
in other states. While anti-discrimination ordinances have generally not listed
factors for assessing relevance along the lines of "Ban the Box" policies, doing
so might offer a more nuanced approach.
337 1d § 8.338 1MEMPHs, TENN., CODE § 3-4-4 (2012); NEw HAVEN, CONN., CODE § 2-852 (2012).
339 See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107; see also supra Part III.D on third-
party collateral consequences.34 0 Bos., MASS., CODE §§ 12-9.1 to .15 (2012).
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One advantage of anti-discrimination ordinances may be their potential for
broader scope: They may apply not only to government employers and licensing
agencies, but to private employers and landlords as well.341 The emphasis on
private entities, however, can draw focus from municipal decision-making. For
example, Urbana's taxicab licensing ordinance, which disqualifies any applicant
with a felony conviction from the previous four years, has been recently
criticized as conflicting with the city's anti-discrimination ordinance. 342 The
advantage of enacting a more comprehensive collateral consequences ordinance
is that it requires municipalities to examine governmental decision-making in a
variety of arenas, including licensing as well as employment and housing. By
providing clear guidelines for when municipalities may impose collateral
consequences on individuals with criminal records, these ordinances offer a
clear path for extension to private employers and landlords as well.
2. Municipal Collection of Collateral Consequences
The lack of scholarly attention to the issue of municipal collateral
consequences reinforces the need for municipalities to offer transparent
information to the public about what collateral consequences are imposed by
their codes of ordinances. Unlike at the state or federal level, no comprehensive
database of collateral consequences is being compiled at the municipal level.
Therefore, it is particularly important that municipalities seeking to address the
issue of collateral consequences commit to collecting, publishing, and updating
the collateral consequences imposed in the municipal code.
While the UCCCA would require attorneys and judges to advise defendants
about relevant collateral consequences, municipalities cannot impose duties on
the state and federal court systems. Municipalities with city court systems could
conceivably require city court judges to provide such information, assuming
they had the power to do so under state law. In any case, Padilla and the ABA
standards already direct attorneys to advise their clients about relevant likely
consequences of a plea. Publishing municipal collateral consequences online
will assist attorneys in fulfilling these obligations.
Even without court disclosure requirements, identifying municipal collateral
consequences is the first step towards reforming them. These compilations may
spur municipalities to reduce or eliminate collateral consequences that are
outdated, little-enforced, or overly harsh. For example, many municipal
restrictions on issuing licenses to individuals with criminal convictions may
date back to the late nineteenth or early twentieth century.343 In developing
New Haven's collateral consequences ordinance, advocates discovered that the
city's code placed inconsistent standards on fingerprinting and criminal
341 See supra Part III.D.
342 Patrick Wade, Vehicle-for-Hire Ordinance's Felon Rule Piques Interest, NEWS-
GAZETTE (Champaign-Urbana, Ill.), May 15, 2013.
34 3 See supra Part HI.A.
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background checks for different licenses. As a result, the collateral
consequences ordinance was modified to standardize the process by which an
applicant's criminal background would be evaluated for all licenses.344
Collecting and publishing the full set of collateral consequences may also help
influence municipal decision-makers to repeal overly harsh ordinances, such as
sex offender residency restrictions, that are costly to enforce and defend in
court.
While the effort of compiling a municipality's collateral consequences and
publishing them online does require some resources, it is likely to be less costly
than such an effort would be for state or federal laws and regulations. Municipal
codes of ordinances tend to be shorter and more limited than state and federal
laws. In addition, many municipal codes are now available in searchable form
online, making it simpler to search for collateral consequences. 345 Because this
provision of the UCCCA has not yet been enacted by any state, municipalities
are uniquely well-placed to demonstrate its feasibility by committing to compile
and update their own collections of collateral consequences. Moreover, as
increasing numbers of cities establish reentry programs or initiatives to reduce
barriers for individuals returning to the community after incarceration, 346 the
collection of collateral consequences may be a natural responsibility for these
programs. New Haven's collateral consequences ordinance, for example,
assigns responsibility to the city's Reentry Initiative for publishing and updating
the city's collection of collateral consequences. Limitations on resources may
prevail, however; although New Haven's collateral consequences ordinance
committed to publishing its compilation online by January 1, 2013, nothing had
been published on the city's website as of January 22, 2014.347
3. Municipal Expungement ofRecords
The UCCCA also includes provisions relating to expunging criminal
records or granting selective relief from their consequences. Municipalities
create and maintain two types of criminal records giving rise to collateral
consequences: First, police departments maintain and distribute information
about arrest records; and second, municipal or county courts create and
maintain conviction records for violations of municipal ordinances. However,
municipalities have generally not enacted ordinances providing for individuals
to seek expungement or sealing of these records. In general, state laws appear to
have preempted this option by enacting relatively comprehensive schemes by
which individuals may apply to limit access to their arrest and/or conviction
records. For example, in People v. Valentine348 an Illinois appellate court held
344 See deleted sections of NEW HAVEN, CONN., CODE §§ 17-4.4(a), 17-6.4, available at
http://nelp.3cdn.net/fc30756eeal 89d6676_lrm6bn7xd.pdf.
34 5 Diller, supra note 68, at 1125.
346 U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 254, at 15-27.
347 CITY OF NEW HAVEN, www.cityofnewhaven.com (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
348 365 N.E.2d 1082, 1086 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
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that state law preempted any municipal ordinance or policy regarding the
expungement of criminal records. Similarly, another Illinois appellate decision
held that the state's interest in keeping track of convictions preempted city
measures that erased convictions for qualified individuals who successfully
completed an alternatives-to-adjudication program.349
In some cases, state laws may grant municipal courts limited powers to
expunge or seal records of arrest or conviction for municipal ordinance
violations. For example, Kansas law details circumstances under which
municipalities may expunge convictions for violations of municipal
ordinances. 350 While at least one municipality (Wichita, Kansas) has an
ordinance on its books detailing the circumstances under which a municipal
court may expunge a record, it simply tracks the language of the state law
granting this power to municipalities.351 Most municipalities in Kansas have
only enacted varying fee schedules for expungement, rather than enacting the
full language of the ordinance. This means that an applicant in Wichita pays
$75 to have a municipal ordinance violation expunged,352 compared to $115 in
Pittsburg, Kansas. 353 While municipalities have generally not created
expungement mechanisms for violations of local ordinances, such a scheme
might well be possible for municipalities possessing the home-rule powers to
enact criminal ordinances.
A more feasible option for municipalities might be to issue certificates or
orders of limited relief from collateral consequences regarding municipal
licenses, employment, or even housing restrictions. Section 10 of the UCCCA
offers a model process by which municipalities could offer orders of limited
relief from municipal collateral consequences based on the applicant's criminal
history, need, and demonstrated absence of risk. While no municipality has yet
enacted such a measure, it would provide significant options for relief from
municipal collateral consequences for individuals seeking licensing,
employment, or even housing in the local community. While creating such a
system would require additional resources, it would enhance a sense of fairness
and dignity by giving a voice to individuals with criminal convictions before
imposing collateral consequences.
4. Why "Ban the Box" Suggests Collateral Consequences Ordinances
Will Succeed
As criminal justice spending by local governments has continued to
increase over the past two decades, more local decision-makers have begun to
349 People v. Vill. of Hanover Park, 724 N.E.2d 132, 144-45 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).350 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-4516 (2012).
351 Wichita, Kan., Charter Ordinance 217 (Mar. 20, 2012).352 WICIA MUN. COURT, EXPUNGEMENT COVERSHEET 1 (2013), available at www.wi
chita.gov/Govemment/Departments/Court/MunicipalCourtDocuments/Expungement%20Co
versheet%202013.pdf.
353 PITTSBURG, KAN., CODE § 1-7 (2011).
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support policies that reduce recidivism and address barriers to reentry for
formerly incarcerated individuals. 354 "Ban the Box" ordinances are an example
of municipalities leading the way as policy innovators in the area of reducing
unnecessarily harsh collateral consequences for people with criminal
convictions. These ordinances began at the municipal level in 2004, with the
first state following after at least twelve cities had implemented "Ban the Box"
policies.355 "Ban the Box" policies have proven much more popular among
municipalities than anti-discrimination ordinances that protect individuals with
criminal records.356 The success of "Ban the Box" policies suggests that
municipalities may be willing to enact collateral consequences ordinances with
the features discussed in the previous sections.
First, "Ban the Box" ordinances offer a precedent for municipalities in
setting standards for when collateral consequences may be imposed based on an
individual's criminal record. As discussed above, "Ban the Box" policies often
outline standards for determining the relevance of a particular individual's
record to a particular job. 357 Although "Ban the Box" standards specifically
apply to collateral consequences in employment, they can easily be translated to
collateral consequences in areas such as municipal licensing. 358
Although similar in many ways to anti-discrimination ordinances, "Ban the
Box" ordinances go beyond the protections provided by anti-discrimination
ordinances by laying out a specific hiring process and set of standards that must
be followed to avoid employment discrimination on the basis of a criminal
record. In addition to requiring changes to the initial application, "Ban the Box"
policies may also require that qualified applicants rejected on the basis of their
criminal records be provided with a copy of the record and an opportunity to
rebut its accuracy or relevance. 359 By offering concrete assurance to applicants
that arrest or conviction records will not automatically disqualify them from
consideration, "Ban the Box" policies encourage qualified individuals to apply
who might be skeptical of the protections offered by anti-discrimination
ordinances. 360 Collateral consequences ordinances would also offer concrete
procedural changes by committing governments to transparently document the
collateral consequences they impose. In addition, publicizing these collateral
consequences may increase pressure on municipalities to add procedural
protections to ensure that collateral consequences are not imposed based on
irrelevant or inaccurate records.
Compared to anti-discrimination ordinances, "Ban the Box" ordinances
may offer fewer options for recourse for individuals who feel that they were
354 JESSE JANNETrA ET AL., URBAN INST., THE ELECTED OFFICIAL'S TOOLKrr FOR JAIL
REENTRY 1 (2011); U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 254, at 1-4.
3 5 5 NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, supra note 257, at 2-9.
356 See supra Part III.C.2.
357 Henry & Jacobs, supra note 234, at 758.
358 See infra Part IV.B.2.
3 5 9 NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, supra note 257, at 10-11.
360 See, e.g., id. at 8.
2014] 53
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
wrongly denied employment. "Ban the Box" ordinances generally do not
provide a private right of action.361 As a result, they may appeal to
municipalities because they require fewer city resources than anti-
discrimination ordinances, which generally require city human rights
commissions to process and investigate claims. As "Ban the Box" ordinances
have become more popular, however, they have begun to expand their reach in
these areas: Buffalo, New York, recently passed a "Ban the Box" ordinance that
covers private employers, includes a private right of action, and allows
aggrieved individuals to file complaints with the city's anti-discrimination
commission.362 Similarly, collateral consequences ordinances modeled on the
UCCCA, like New Haven's, do not include a private right of action. While
these ordinances do require resources to collect and update municipal collateral
consequences, they do not require the resources or potential for liability of anti-
discrimination ordinances.
The purpose of "Ban the Box" ordinances is not to blindly eliminate
collateral consequences; instead, they recognize that criminal convictions may
be relevant in certain employment situations and clearly delineate the standards
for determining when such consequences should apply. This mitigating
approach furthers what Michael Pinard has called a "dignity-based approach to
collateral consequences" by offering individuals with criminal convictions an
opportunity to be viewed on a level playing field with other applicants for
employment. 363 For municipalities that recognize the importance of treating
individuals with criminal convictions with dignity and seek to reduce the
economic impact of the cycle of incarceration, collateral consequences
ordinances are a natural next step.
The decision by New Haven, Connecticut, to enact the first municipal
collateral consequences ordinance followed the passage of a "Ban the Box"
ordinance in 2009.364 The ordinance was drafted by the city's Reentry Initiative,
working with the Yale Law School's Reentry Clinic, and approved by the
mayor's office and the city's Corporation Counsel. Because the ordinance set
standards for denying licenses based on prior convictions, advocates also
worked closely with the city's Building Department (which issues licenses) and
police chief (which approves or denies licenses based on a background check)
to ensure their support. With the support of a coalition of reentry advocates, the
ordinance passed New Haven's Board of Aldermen with unanimous support.
The widespread popularity of the city's "Ban the Box" ordinance paved the way
3 61See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 124201, § 14.17.030 (June 20, 2013),
available at http://clerk.ci.seattle.wa.us/-archives/Ordinances/Ord_124201.pdf.362 Katharine H. Parker, Leslie E. Silverman & Kelly Anne Targett, Buffalo's "Ban the
Box" Ordinance Covers Private Employers, MONDAQ, June 26, 2013.363 Pinard, Collateral Consequences, supra note 2, at 529.
364 Press Release, City of New Haven, Board of Aldermen Votes Unanimously To
Approve First in the Nation Collateral Consequences Ordinance (Apr. 2, 2012), available at
http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/Mayor/ReadMore.asp?ID= {92B20A3E-3EAB-4F91-9E44-
OF6669B4AB41}.
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for the passage of this groundbreaking ordinance. 365 Just as the "Ban the Box"
ordinance set standards for considering criminal records in employment, New
Haven's collateral consequences ordinance set standards for considering
criminal records in licensing and other types of municipal decision-making. The
similarities between "Ban the Box" and collateral consequences ordinances also
made it easier for advocates to explain the ordinance to aldermen, city
department heads and other stakeholders, and the media.
Other cities have used anti-discrimination ordinances to prohibit the
impermissible imposition of collateral consequences based on arrest or
conviction records. Although states have not yet embraced the UCCCA,
municipalities can lead the way on this issue by enacting collateral
consequences ordinances on the local level. Municipal governments in
communities with high rates of incarceration may more readily recognize the
importance of reintegrating individuals with criminal convictions than state or
federal governments. 366 As with "Ban the Box" ordinances, municipalities can
show that policies mitigating collateral consequences are manageable and
popular before they filter up to the state level.367 For example, New Haven city
government has already used the unanimous passage of the city ordinance as a
tool in advocating for statewide collateral consequences legislation in
Connecticut. 368
V. CONCLUSION
Although they are often overlooked by scholars and legal reformers,
numerous collateral consequences of criminal convictions are imposed through
city and county ordinances. The most serious and widespread municipal
collateral consequences fall into four general categories: licensing ordinances,
registration and exclusionary zones, local hiring policies, and third-party
background-check requirements. Despite their lack of visibility, these local
policies have been used as a way to exile "undesirable" populations by
effectively barring them from residing, working, or participating in public life in
their communities. Moreover, where exclusionary local ordinances have
successfully withstood legal challenges, they often filter up to the state level.
Increased attention by local and state legislators to the issue of collateral
consequences, particularly in employment, suggests that legislative reforms at
the local as well as at the state level can help to mitigate this problem. At the
state level, preemption laws can help to eliminate the patchwork of harsh
restrictions on the most stigmatized populations, such as individuals required to
365 Id
366 Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, Note, New Frontiers in Fair Lending: Confronting Lending
Discrimination Against Ex-Offenders, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1237, 1264 (2005).
367 Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REv. 1113, 1119 (2007).368 Althea Marshall Brooks, Community Services Administrator of the City of New
Haven, Testimony Submitted to the Judiciary Committee in Support of S.B. 1063, An Act
Concerning the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act (Mar. 11, 2013).
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register for sex offenses. At the local level, cities should follow the example of
New Haven and the UCCCA in enacting innovative ordinances to mitigate
unnecessarily harsh collateral consequences. The success of "Ban the Box"
ordinances suggests that cities may lead the way as policy innovators for the
states on the issue of collateral consequences.
